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Courts and legal observers have long been concerned by the scope of authority 
delegated to administrative agencies. The dominant explanation of delegated 
authority is that it is necessary to take advantage of administrative agencies’ expertise 
and expansive rulemaking capacity. Though this explanation makes sense in many 
settings, it falters in many areas and has given rise to a number of longstanding 
puzzles, such as why Congress does not invest in its own institutional capacity. 
Unrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that Congress may 
delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of administrative 
decisionmaking: the credible rationality and transparency afforded by administrative 
procedures. Drawing on positive political theory, this Article shows that Congress may 
delegate, not for expertise, but for public trust, which the legislature itself 
(appropriately) lacks due to concerns over the influence of special interest lucre, 
among other reasons. The procedural constraints that bind administrative agencies, 
as made credible by judicial review, encourage fairness and rationality and 
discourage the most egregious abuses of lawmaking authority. In delegating, Congress 
takes advantage of these credible constraints, which the institution cannot easily 
develop internally; and in relieving Members of Congress from public suspicion, it 
also advances their parochial electoral objectives. 
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This vision of the administrative state accounts for a number of features of our 
legal and political system. It explains, for instance, why Congress has generally not 
invested in greater internal capacity—because trust, not capacity is the binding 
constraint; why, as a positive matter, fairness and transparency are essential to 
administrative procedures; and why, if those administrative procedures undergo 
erosion, as some suggest has occurred, anxiety about administrative lawmaking might 
arise. The Article concludes with a discussion of normative and doctrinal implications 
of this trust-based conception of administration, including a call for reorienting 
administrative procedures to more fully promote credible rationality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The administrative state is an awkward creature in our constitutional 
system—in the eyes of many, an unseemly chimera that dangerously collapses 
the lawmaking institutions envisioned by the framers. For this reason, from 
the administrative state’s earliest days its supporters have felt the need to 
justify it. Looking to judicial opinions or academic writing, the dominant 
explanation of and justification for the administrative state is based on 
administrative agencies’ expertise and expansive rulemaking and adjudicatory 
capacities.1 The administrative state, in this view, emerges from crippling 
congressional limitations: the institution has neither the time nor the 
information to resolve the problems that our complex society presents, so it 
creates and delegates authority to other entities that have the time and 
capacity to resolve them. 
This common justification no doubt captures part of the truth.2 Yet it also 
leaves us with a number of puzzles. Observers such as John Hart Ely have 
 
1 For judicial thinking, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (discussing how Congress delegates authority to agencies, “those with great 
expertise”). For classic academic thinking, see JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 23 (1938) (explaining the need for and the “advantages of specialization in the field of 
regulatory activity”), or, for an account of many of the conventional views on this topic, see generally 
John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, Democratic Rulemaking, in 3 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 52 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (examining four prominent 
views of administrative rulemaking: the unitary executive theory, the structure and process school 
of thought, the insulation perspective, and the deliberative perspective). See also WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
276 (2010). Part I of this Article discusses the conventional view at length. 
2 It is difficult to imagine, for instance, Congress somehow writing fine enough legislative 
standards to displace the roughly 1500 Administrative Law Judges who adjudicate Social Security 
claims. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES BY AGENCY AND 
LEVEL (2016), https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-
Agency [https://perma.cc/PAF8-3DJU]. There may likewise be other areas where the relevant 
expertise cannot be suitably internalized with the legislature: the policy question may be highly time 
sensitive, or it may be of an interstitial nature, better sorted by those with experience “on the 
ground.” A more difficult case is when knowledge acquired through enforcement or other “on the 
ground” experience interacts with and is complementary to rule-making activities. Sometimes that 
enforcement-derived information may plausibly be transferred to other entities, such as the 
legislature, and sometimes it may not be. For more strongly skeptical takes on the common expertise 
account, see Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-
27 (1982) (arguing that “[c]onventional rationalizations for the delegation of legislative authority” 
do not “withstand close scrutiny”). 
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long wondered why Congress has not invested in its own institutional 
capacity.3 If information and capacity are the binding constraints, why not 
expand the institution’s ability to collect and process information? Similarly, 
if expertise is the limitation, agencies in much their current form might 
perform an advisory rather than lawmaking role,4 with Congress itself making 
the laws.5 But agencies of course issue thousands of rules that carry the force 
of law every year.6 Also puzzling, the administrative state is more expert and 
able than at any time in history,7 and its place in American society should be 
correspondingly secure under this standard justification. But instead, anxiety 
over the administrative state appears at a new height, with many calling for 
radical overhauls of it and renewed interest in the non-delegation doctrine 
seemingly on the rise in the Court.8 
 
3 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133-
34 (1980) (arguing, among other things, that Congress might massively expand its native capacities 
to overcome current limitations); see also LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS 
LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE 
CORPORATE 34 (2015) (arguing that congressional capacity is too limited “to develop meaningful 
policy expertise”). I owe a debt to Ely for the spirit of my title. 
4 Throughout this Article the term “lawmaking” is used in the sense of Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., which is to recognize agency 
rulemaking authority as “legislative” power. 531 U.S. 457, 487-89 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
5 E.g., ELY, supra note 3, at 133 (observing that Members of Congress “are [] entitled to the 
assistance of the executive departments’ technical staffs”). Note that we might regard the 
congressional reference cases as a very embryonic institutional arrangement of this sort. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (establishing the procedure for congressional reference cases, in which 
Congress refers a bill to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to resolve factual and legal questions on 
an advisory basis). 
6 See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that agencies promulgate 
“thousands” of rules “during an administration”). 
7 See, e.g., GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS 11-14 (2014) (showing a steady increase in the percentage 
of public sector workers with bachelors’ degrees and advanced degrees). 
8 For a discussion of suggestive rumblings on the Supreme Court, see Ronald A. Cass, 
Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State 33 (George Mason 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 16-07) (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741208 [https://perma.cc/9UJ2-QTQL] (“Two separate opinions . . . by 
Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas, suggested that at least two members of the Court 
were prepared to consider constitutional problems attending delegation of policy-making 
authority.”). For the most notable congressional efforts, see Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, 
H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (as passed by the House, Jan. 12, 2017) (attempting, in part “[t]o reform the 
process by which . . . agencies analyze and formulate new regulations”). For classic, as well as recent, 
academic critiques of the administrative state, see MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF 
THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 67 (1977) (“Regulatory commissions protect the regulated 
and exploit the public.”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 386 (2014) 
(arguing that the concept of delegation suggests “that Congress cannot subdelegate its lawmaking 
power”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 93 (1979) (claiming that “broad and unguided delegation of power is the weakest 
timber in the shaky structure of the new public philosophy.”); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99 
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The standard account, moreover, arguably most falters on the most 
consequential rulemaking efforts by agencies—that is, on high-impact, non-
time-sensitive rules. For example, many have questioned the widespread 
delegation of authority in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010,9 including the 
delegation of how to separate commercial and investment banking services.10 
Congress might instead have established the relevant rule itself, subjecting it 
to subsequent refinement by administrative agencies. Indeed, this is largely 
how Congress approached the question of separating commercial and 
investment banking services in the Banking Act of 1933.11 Similarly, the 
Department of Labor’s rule laying out who is a fiduciary with respect to 
employee benefit plans might easily have been handled legislatively.12 Much 
the same could be said of the Department of Transportation’s periodic 
regulations that set fuel economy standards for automobiles sold in the 
United States.13 Expertise and capacity are but part of the story, and perhaps 
not the most important part of the story. 
Unrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that 
Congress may delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of 
administrative decisionmaking: the credible rationality and transparency 
afforded by administrative procedures. Drawing on positive political theory,14 
this Article is the first to show that Congress may delegate, not for expertise, 
but for public trust. The core of the theory is straightforward: what limits 
Congress is not expertise, but public trust; what Congress gains from 
delegation is not expertise, as such, but instead public trust. The main task of 
this Article is to articulate why the public distrusts elected representatives,15 
 
(1993) (“When the elected lawmakers delegate, the people lose control over the laws that govern 
them.”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233-49 
(1994) (arguing that the administrative state is unconstitutional and contrary to the original meaning 
of the Constitution). A common sentiment in this strand of the literature, it seems, is that much would 
be resolved if we paid greater attention to Article I’s Vesting Clause and disallowed or sharply curtailed 
substantial lawmaking by administrative bodies. As becomes clear below, I depart from this view. 
9 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE 
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 90 (Cary Coglianese, ed., 2012) (questioning 
whether Congress delegated rulemaking authority to take advantage of agency expertise). 
10 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5481–
603 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–02, 1631 (2012). 
11 Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
12 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (2016). 
13 E.g., Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12 (2016). 
14 For recent notable positive efforts in other domains, see Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and 
Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 665-67, 669-72 
(2011) (applying positive political theory to the question of constitutional commitment, and 
describing the positive theory in this area). 
15 See infra Section II.A, Analytical Appendix. 
638 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 633 
why elected representatives cannot solve the problem of trust internally,16 and 
under what conditions administrative lawmaking generates superior public 
trust.17 As part of this exercise, the Article shows how Members of Congress 
delegate in their own interest—how, though administrative lawmaking may 
serve a public interest, legislators delegate authority for self-interested and 
parochial electoral reasons.18 
This idea that legislative delegation and the much-maligned bureaucracy 
address problems of public trust likely seems absurd to many. The 
administrative state is the source of our ills, not of our relief. This reaction is 
understandable, particularly given the standard view that, if Congress had 
sufficient information and time, it would be better on democratic grounds for 
it to resolve questions rather than the administrative state. Even those who 
defend the administrative state tend to view it as a distinct second-best, a 
necessary concession to the complex demands that our society places on 
government.19 But this is only the standard view because jurists and 
administrative law scholars have tended not to focus on the pathologies of 
other potential lawmaking bodies. Problems of distrust between the public 
and the elected come hand-in-glove with modern representative democracy.20 
Voters do not do particularly well by legislative lawmaking in complex 
societies, and by helping to resolve this distrust, the administrative state—at 
least with adequate safeguards—furthers rather than compromises 
democratic values.21 
The administrative state offers advantages over the legislature in terms of 
the values of transparency and fairness.22 These advantages do not emerge 
 
16 See infra Section II.C, Analytical Appendix. 
17 See infra Section II.B, Analytical Appendix. 
18 See infra Analytical Appendix. 
19 See infra Part I. 
20 See infra Section II.A, Analytical Appendix Section A. 
21 See infra Part II, Analytical Appendix. Here, I conceive of “democratic values” as those that 
promote responsiveness to voter interests and preferences, in the way described in the Appendix. 
Naturally, if one formalistically defines “democratic values” to mean decisionmaking by democratically 
elected officials, decisionmaking by bureaucrats offers little hope of advancing those values. 
22 See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 134-42 (2008) (arguing that agencies are more likely than 
legislatures to consider a range of interests, not just those that are the most powerful, best 
represented, or submit the most information); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s 
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1948-
79 (2008) (arguing that actions exhibit more transparency and deliberation than congressional 
actions); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1541-42 (1992) (arguing that administrative lawmaking represents the “best 
hope” for realizing the values of deliberative democracy by ensuring informed—but politically 
insulated—decisionmaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-64 (1985) (describing agencies’ goal as “not merely respond[ing] to political 
pressure but . . . instead deliberating in order to identify and implement the public values that 
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simply by virtue of the fact that an agency is not the legislature, but instead 
from the fact that agencies operate under a set of constraints that do not apply 
to the legislature.23 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
related administrative law doctrines,24 agencies must follow certain 
procedures before issuing a valid order or rule: formal adjudication and 
rulemakings require proper notice and other procedural safeguards that 
approach the protections afforded at a court of law.25 Even informal 
rulemakings require notice and, as glossed by courts, a notable degree of 
dialogue between agencies and regulated parties.26 The APA’s generic 
standards of review, likewise, demand from agencies a minimum of rationality 
in policymaking; the agency must provide reasons for its actions and justify 
its choices in light of statutory text and objectives.27 This transparency is 
important because it allows the administrative state to act as a verification 
 
should control the controversy”); see also Norton E. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 808, 814 (1952) (arguing that “[t]he capture of commissions . . . by the regulated 
interests has often been charged, not without persuasive evidence . . . . Yet however crassly one-
sided an agency of government may become, few indeed will be found so completely under the 
dominance of a single interest as the subject matter committees of Congress”). The idea that 
transparency is in the interest of the government itself is very old. Nearly two hundred years ago, 
Jeremy Bentham wrote, 
Suspicion always attaches to mystery. It thinks it sees a crime where it beholds an 
affectation of secre[c]y; and it is rarely deceived. For why should we hide ourselves if 
we do not dread being seen? . . . But in an open and free policy, what confidence and 
security—I do not say for the people, but for the governors themselves! Let it be 
impossible that any thing should be done which is unknown to the nation—prove to 
it that you neither intend to deceive nor to surprise—you take away all the weapons 
of discontent. The public will repay with usury the confidence you repose in it. 
Calumny will lose its force; it collects its venom in the caverns of obscurity, but it is 
destroyed by the light of day. 
JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Political Tactics, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 299, 310-11 (1962). 
23 See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN ET AL., DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING: THE UNITED 
STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 31-103 (2015) (providing a comparative 
assessment of presidential and parliamentary regimes and describing the far more demanding 
judicial review of and procedural constraints on administrative lawmaking relative to legislative 
lawmaking in the United States). 
24 Important doctrines outside the APA in this respect include the “Arizona Grocery” or 
“Accardi” principle that agencies must follow their own rules, as well as the “Chenery” principle, 
which calls on courts to judge agency actions on the grounds “upon which the record discloses that 
its action was based.” Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 
389 (1932); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-68 (1954); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
25 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012) (allowing for depositions, oral and documentary evidence, cross-
examination of witnesses, and the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, for example). 
26 § 553(c). The judicial gloss mainly arrives through arbitrariness review under § 706(2)(A) 
(directing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
27 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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mechanism that constrains policymaking behavior and thereby fosters public 
trust in policy choices. Against the backdrop of administrative procedures 
and judicial review, it is relatively challenging to engage in at least the most 
obscene forms of misfeasance through administrative lawmaking.28 
Notably, this type of trust cannot be achieved through direct legislation, 
which lacks a meaningful record, and is inevitably reviewed far more 
deferentially by courts, with little regard to rationality or to the nexus of 
stated objectives and chosen means.29 Whereas courts have no problem 
reviewing and reprimanding administrative agencies—that is, constitutional 
inferiors—for procedural failures or flaws in reasoning, they cannot be 
expected to regularly do so with respect to the legislation produced by a 
coordinate branch of government.30 In a complex society, the absence of 
meaningful judicial review—to say nothing of safeguards like those afforded 
by administrative procedures—in the legislative context implies that voters 
will often question the fidelity of legislation to their interests.31 This public 
distrust represents a significant electoral risk for Members of Congress, 
leading them to favor administrative policymaking over direct legislation for 
self-interested reasons.32 At its core, this theory contends that the modern 
administrative state ameliorates a problem of public distrust and legislative 
credibility: by delegating to a procedurally constrained, constitutional 
inferior, the legislature addresses a critical information problem between the 
public and legislators that naturally arises in complex representative 
democracies. 
This theory of delegating for trust resolves a number of puzzles. First, it 
addresses John Hart Ely’s question of why amplifying legislative capacity is 
not a tenable solution. Trust, not information, is the binding constraint on 
legislators’ behavior, and it is comparatively difficult for the legislature to 
generate public trust internally. In this way, it also helps us to understand 
why we have prolific delegation in some areas, such as financial regulation, 
 
28 Although this Article is, to my knowledge, the first to ground concerns over capture in 
underlying problems of information and consequent voter distrust, and to indicate how the 
administrative state and procedures help resolve these information problems, the idea that insulation 
from politics might help to avoid problems of capture is not new. For a compelling recent entry, see 
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
15, 19-26 (2010) (discussing the role of agency insulation in addressing regulatory capture). The 
present effort is sympathetic to these such efforts, but principally represents a positive theory of 
delegation, seeking to explain why delegation occurs. 
29 See infra Section II.C. 
30 Id. Reflecting this basic reality, even where the courts stand in the strongest position, on 
claims of constitutional violations, they have created an impressive array of justiciability doctrines 
to avoid deciding cases that implicate the operations of coordinate branches. 
31 See infra Part II, Analytical Appendix. 
32 See infra Section II.B, Analytical Appendix Section B. 
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where we have very good reasons to suspect that special interest groups would 
capture the legislative process, but less delegation in other areas, where trust 
is less of a concern.33 Second, it provides a positive rather than normative 
rationale for valuing fairness and transparency in administrative procedures, 
restoring the centrality of these values to our understanding of procedures. 
This is a sharp departure from the dominant positive perspective on 
administrative procedures, which sees them as instruments of political 
control.34 Fairness and transparency are important, in this theory, because 
they serve a political and electoral purpose for legislators: they foster public 
trust amid problems of incomplete information and allow legislators to 
delegate lawmaking authority.35 Third, the theory suggests an explanation for 
the wave of anxiety sweeping academia and the courts regarding the 
administrative state. Trust accompanies administrative lawmaking only for 
highly contingent reasons: it is the credible procedural constraints that 
encourage fairness and transparency, allowing some assurance of rationality 
and of public interest in policymaking, that represents the administrative 
state’s central virtue. The erosion of procedural norms and practices, 
therefore, strikes at the foundation of the rationale for the administrative 
state. In league with recent articles that point to a divergence between the 
assumptions of administrative law and administrative practices,36 this theory 
 
33 See infra Section III.C. 
34 Professors McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, collectively known as “McNollGast,” pioneered 
the positive study of administrative procedures in a series of seminal articles. See Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 248-53 (1987) [hereinafter McNollGast, Administrative 
Procedures] (developing a theory of administrative procedures, such as notice, as a set of techniques 
to exert political control over agencies); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. 
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control 
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-44 (1989) (further developing the theory of administrative 
procedures as a means of political control over agencies); see also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 106-10 (1994) 
(discussing the importance of learning an agency’s “hidden knowledge” in holding agencies 
accountable to the legislature); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: 
Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 104-10 (1994) (identifying 
institutional features that enable legislators to learn from regulators and exert control over agencies); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 93, 99-100 (1992) (arguing Congress’s ability to structure an administrative agency is 
perhaps “the most powerful device available” to control agency policymaking); Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 
28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165-71 (1984) (discussing Congress’s preference for punishing agencies when 
they are detected violating legislative priorities as opposed to continuously monitoring them). 
35 It also addresses several puzzles that the political control perspective on administrative 
procedures leaves us with, for example, explaining the otherwise perplexing obsession of the framers 
of the APA with whether the public would perceive the procedures as fair. See infra Section III.A. 
36 See infra Section IV.A. 
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suggests that erosion may be a main contributor to anxiety over the 
administrative state.37 
The theory further carries suggestions for a number of current doctrinal 
and policy debates. The theory suggests reorienting procedures and judicial 
review in various ways to promote public trust, for example by requiring 
Federal Register–like publication of guidance documents and encouraging 
agencies to engage in cost–benefit analysis.38 It also indicates that calls for a 
more robust non-delegation doctrine fall off the mark. Proponents of the non-
delegation doctrine fail to recognize the impetus for delegation in the first 
instance—the compromised nature of legislative lawmaking.39 
This Article proceeds in five main parts. Part I discusses the conventional 
expertise rationale for the administrative state and doctrinal dependencies. 
Part II articulates the main theoretical contribution of this Article, 
introducing the problem of democratic distrust, and showing how 
procedurally constrained delegation to a constitutional inferior addresses the 
problem. Part III extends the theory by considering three important 
implications. Part IV questions whether the procedural regularity at the 
foundation of the administrative state’s functional role in our representative 
democracy is eroding, and probes this erosion as a possible explanation of the 
anxiety prevailing in some quarters. Part V discusses lessons of the theory for 
prevailing debates in administrative law.40 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT AND DEPENDENCIES 
A. The Conventional Account 
Over the years, scholars and jurists have advanced a wide range of views 
about delegation and the foundations of the administrative state. The most 
common view, however, is that the legislature delegates to administrative 
agencies for their expertise and expansive capacity to issue rules and 
adjudicate cases; i.e., that the administrative state exists due to various 
capacity constraints that the legislature suffers as a generalist body.41 The 
 
37 Id. Other plausible sources of anxiety include polarization of the Judiciary, such that judges 
cannot credibly enforce procedures. 
38 See infra Section V.A. 
39 See infra Section V.B. 
40 The Analytical Appendix contains a formalization of the Article’s main theoretical argument 
and contribution. 
41 See infra notes 42-48. Other minority views include the following: First, some argue that the 
administrative state represents a device for avoiding time-consistency problems. See, e.g., Kenneth 
Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1169, 
1180 (1985) (showing that delegation to a biased decisionmaker may address problems of 
commitment in the monetary context); see also Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Electoral Competition, Political 
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Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 322 (2002) (analyzing how electoral 
conditions influence the decision to insulate agencies against dynamics in legislative preferences); 
Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political 
Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency 
Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 506-07 (1989) (showing that enacting coalitions recognize time-
consistency problems and create procedures to guard against shifts in legislative preferences); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 93, 99 (1992) (“Agency structure and design perpetuate the power and legitimacy of certain 
groups and undermine the power and legitimacy of others, thereby leading to the reduction of 
coalitional drift by minimizing the chances that politicians’ preferences over the relevant issues will 
change over time.”). For a more recent take on this point, emphasizing endogenous information 
acquisition, see SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING 25 (2012) 
(describing how political and personnel management policies can incentivize agencies to acquire 
expertise); Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and 
Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 886 (2007) (same); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 485-88 
(2007) (describing how Congress and courts influence how agencies acquire expertise). Along with 
coauthor John de Figuereido, I examine the possibility of delegation to overcome problems of time-
inconsistency in de Figueiredo & Stiglitz, supra note 1, but we note that it applies only in the limited 
places where time-consistency is an issue.  
Second, another class of theories argues that the administrative state represents a cynical ruse 
perpetrated on voters by elected officials. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 3, at 132 (arguing that by 
delegating “our legislators are escaping the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible 
functioning of a democratic republic”); Peter H. Aranson et al., supra note 2, at 57-58 (arguing that 
delegation results in a “shift in responsibility” to agencies from legislators); Morris P. Fiorina, 
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 233, 
247 (1982) (observing that by delegating “legislators not only avoid the time and trouble of making 
specific decisions, they avoid or at least disguise their responsibility for the consequences of the 
decisions ultimately made.”); see also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE 
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 67 (2d. ed. 1989) (contending that “congressmen appropriate all 
the public credit generated in the system, while the bureaucracy absorbs all the costs”); DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION 110 (1993) (arguing that “[d]elegation allows legislators and the president 
to escape some of the blame for selfish government policies while still claiming much of the credit”). 
For a recent entry along these lines, see Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation 
Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1465, 1492 (2015) (arguing delegation 
“provides numerous benefits to legislators by allowing them to influence and control 
administration,” which “undermines democratic accountability”). A challenge to this voter-as-dupe 
approach is that it assumes an unrealistic degree of voter stupidity. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP 
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 82 (1991) (observing that we “should be chary of the 
underlying assumptions of voter stupidity and entrepreneurial laxity” at the foundation of these 
cynical theories); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 78-79 (2007) 
(arguing citizens will hold Congress responsible for the act of delegation itself). It is also difficult 
to square with the design of many administrative procedures. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of 
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1998) (arguing that 
the cynical theories fit poorly with our understanding of administrative procedures). By comparison, 
the theory proposed in this Article features a rational voter acting in an environment of incomplete 
information, and fits cleanly with a traditional view of administrative procedures. In this sense, this 
Article provides a unified theory of delegation and administrative procedures.  
Finally, another recent and provocative theory maintains that the administrative state exists to 
manage failures of interpersonal justice, in much the role we imagine private law. See Hanoch Dagan 
& Roy Kreitner, The Bureaucrats of Private Law 3 (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
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solution to this difficulty, in the common view, is to establish institutions that 
have the time and expertise necessary to resolve the relevant problems, and 
for the legislature to delegate, in large measure, the responsibility of resolving 
the problems to these institutions. Collectively, we call these new 
information-privileged lawmaking institutions “the administrative state.” 
This perspective on the administrative state so deeply pervades the 
scholarly literature that it is difficult to isolate highly relevant pieces. One 
foundational statement of this perspective, though, comes from the period 
following the New Deal and accompanying expansion of the administrative 
state. James M. Landis delivered the 1938 Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence 
at Yale University, shortly after his tenure in both the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the 
opening paragraphs of his lectures, Landis sets up the administrative state in 
classic fashion: “the administrative process springs from the inadequacy of a 
simple tripartite form of government to deal with modern problems.”42 The 
administrative state, thus, emerges from the deficiencies of the legislature and 
traditional Madisonian institutional forms. The great advantage of 
administrative agencies, in his view, was specialization and expertise. “With 
the rise of regulation,” by which Landis meant the regulation of economic 
conduct, 
the need for expertness became dominant; for the art of regulating an 
industry requires knowledge of the details of its operations, ability to shift 
requirements as condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of 
energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power 
through enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy.43 
The inadequacy of Madison’s institutions, and the virtue of the administrative 
state, therefore, lies in expertise and superior information. 
Hardly a relic of the New Deal–era, this remains the dominant view 
among scholars today. The academic legal literature, for example, tends to 
track much this line regarding expertise and delegation.44 Other academic 
disciplines have the same tendency. The economics literature focuses on the 
 
42 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (Yale Univ. Press 1938). 
43 Id. at 23-24. 
44 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 445 (2008) (cataloging conventional explanations of 
delegation to agencies, noting that “[o]ne of the most common defenses of delegation to agencies is 
that agencies possess technical expertise that Congress lacks”); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, 
A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 100-01 (2000) (arguing delegation 
is consistent with Madisonian values). 
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ability of bureaucrats to render expert policies as a rationale for delegation.45 
The political science literature is much the same, characterizing the benefits 
of delegation in terms of enhanced information and expertise.46 Most of the 
literature in this area is consumed by the question of how the legislature 
might obtain the information advantages of delegation without undue loss of 
control over policies to agencies.47 Reflecting the common view across fields 
of academic inquiry, Professor Stephenson summarizes, “the delegation of 
substantial policymaking authority to administrative agencies is often both 
explained and justified by the belief that agencies have more accurate 
information about the actual impacts of different policy choices.”48 
B. Doctrinal and Normative Dependencies 
Judicial views mirror those of academics. We see judicial understandings 
of the delegation question most clearly in the contexts of the non-delegation 
doctrine and of the level of deference that is afforded to agencies’ 
interpretations of statutes. 
The non-delegation doctrine prohibits the legislature from delegating 
“legislative” power to other entities.49 Though the Court has never disavowed 
this doctrine, the view of what constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power has changed over time. Under today’s conception, the 
legislature need only provide an “intelligible principle” in the statute to avoid 
 
45 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy 
Task, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 169, 177 (2007) (noting that complex and technical questions typically get 
delegated to bureaucrats). 
46 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 7-8 
(1999) (noting a tradeoff between information acquisition and loss of control over policy outcomes); 
JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 2 (2002) (describing the tradeoff Congress faces 
between bureaucratic expertise in policy areas and the opportunity this provides bureaucrats to work 
against the interests of legislators); Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional 
Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62 (1995) (arguing that 
“[d]elegation allows better information to be obtained about the consequences of alternative 
policies,” and studying the tradeoff of this benefit against loss of control over outcomes). 
47 HUBER & SHIPAN, supra note 46; see also David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, 
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 697 (1994) 
(discussing the tradeoff involved when Congress directly limits agency discretion). 
48 Stephenson, supra note 41, at 469 (arguing that agency expertise is not a given and instead 
arises endogenously, if at all). 
49 E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (denying 
Congress the ability to “abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which 
it is thus vested”). For a recent empirical analysis of the non-delegation doctrine, see Edward H. 
Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 33 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author). 
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an unconstitutional delegation,50 and “intelligible” has come to have a loose 
meaning over time. For example, the “public interest” standard is satisfactory 
under current doctrine.51 This looseness has led many to regard the doctrine 
as essentially spent, though lower courts and scholars routinely attempt to 
bring new life to the idea.52 
But what drove the non-delegation doctrine to this “moribund” status?53 
Much at play seems to be the judicial recognition that over time Congress has 
increasingly required expertise to draft laws. For example, in Mistretta v. 
United States, the Court countered a non-delegation challenge by noting the 
difficulty that Congress would face in developing prison sentencing 
guidelines; that, Justice Blackmun wrote, “is precisely the sort of intricate, 
labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially 
appropriate.”54 In another case, Justice White likewise noted that “to refrain 
from delegating” would leave Congress “with a hopeless task of writing laws 
with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the 
entire policy landscape.”55 This respect for expertise leads courts to defer to 
Congress as to when the “inherent necessities”56 of government operations 
demand legislative delegation of authority—as Justice Scalia put it, “it is small 
wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress 
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying the law.”57 The dominant expertise and capacity 
rationale for delegation, in this way, has nearly led to the interment of the 
non-delegation doctrine.58 
 
50 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down 
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed 
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). 
51 E.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943) (describing how the public 
interest standard suitably limits delegation to the Federal Communications Commission). 
52 For a recent lower court decision relying on the doctrine, see Association of American Railroads 
v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding the delegation of 
authority to Amtrak, deemed a private corporation, was unconstitutional), vacated and remanded, 135 
S. Ct. 1225 (2015). For recent instances of scholarly calls, see Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution 
Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 61-66 (2010) (arguing Congress unconstitutionally 
delegated to the Treasury Department in the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)), and 
HAMBURGER, supra note 8. 
53 Nat’l. Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the non-delegation doctrine as “surely as moribund as the substantive due process 
approach of the same era—for which the Court is fond of writing an obituary—if not more so”). 
54 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989). 
55 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
56 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
57 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1753-54 (2002). 
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In similar manner, the common capacity rationale drives judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes. In the landmark Chevron, the 
Court motivated deference to agency interpretations of law, in part, on an 
understanding of Congress’s intent to delegate to an expert agency.59 There, 
the Court observed the “technical and complex” nature of the regulatory 
program,60 and noted that Congress itself did not resolve the relevant legal 
question in the statute. The Court then speculated that, “[p]erhaps 
[Congress] consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level, 
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”61 Thus, 
under this reasoning, the Court defers to the agency based on a theory of 
congressional motivation for delegation. This doctrinal position rests on an 
understanding that Congress delegates to avail itself of agency expertise, and 
judicial deference to the agency effectuates congressional intent.62 
The prevailing understandings in two major doctrinal areas, therefore, build 
out from the expertise theory of delegation. The loose conception of the non-
delegation doctrine emanates from a judicial sense that Congress must delegate 
out of necessity due to its institutional limitations; and deference is afforded to 
agency interpretations of law on much the same basis, that is, on the theory 
that Congress delegated to agencies so that an expert may implement and 
interpret the law, waving off interventions by generalist judges. 
C. The Democratic Price 
What is equally clear, however, is that courts reach these doctrinal 
positions reluctantly—the permissive stances on delegation and deference 
represent concessions rather than ideal positions. Absent the need of 
expertise or information, courts would turn a far more skeptical eye towards 
delegations of lawmaking authority. The reason for the reluctance, and the 
underlying rationale for the non-delegation doctrine, is that in common 
telling delegation implies a loss of democratic control over public policy. As 
Justice Scalia puts it, “It is difficult to imagine a principle more essential to 
democratic government than that upon which the doctrine of 
 
59 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting 
that because “[j]udges are not experts in the field” courts should defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes because of their putative expertise). 
60 Id. at 865. 
61 Id. 
62 Notice that this Chevron reasoning builds on an earlier line of cases in which courts justified 
deference to agency interpretations based on expertise, but did so without the overlay of 
congressional intent. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002) (discussing the 
evolving rationales for judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes). 
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unconstitutional delegation is founded: Except in a few areas constitutionally 
committed to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing 
society are to be made by the Legislature.”63 
Indeed, reflecting this unease, courts sometimes—and perhaps 
increasingly—balk when it comes to legislative delegations on important 
policy questions that do not plainly require non-legislative expertise. Despite 
clear statutory text to this effect, for instance, the Court denied the FDA the 
authority to regulate tobacco, reasoning that “[g]iven the economic and 
political significance of the tobacco industry at the time [of passage], it is 
extremely unlikely that Congress could have intended to place tobacco within 
the ambit” of the statute.64 
This judicial understanding reflects, or is reflected by, the academic 
understanding. In the standard academic telling, too, the cost of this expertise 
is the loss of democratic legitimacy. As their officers are not elected, agencies 
do not have the democratic legitimacy that Congress does. This indeed leads 
to near obsession in the administrative law literature with somehow 
reconciling the fact that agencies issue rules with the force of law with 
fundamental democratic commitments. Scholars advance various “solutions” 
to this legitimacy problem, but with little enduring success—it is “[l]ike an 
intriguing but awkward family heirloom . . . handed down from generation 
to generation of administrative law scholars.”65 But for almost all scholars, 
absent the need for expertise, it would be superior to have the legislature 
make the laws, as that is the branch with democratic legitimacy. If Congress 
had the necessary expertise and capacity, scarcely any would venture to 
support administrative lawmaking. Thus, scholars, too, only reluctantly 
embrace administrative lawmaking. 
This gnawing, seemingly irreducible democratic price of delegated 
authority explains a number of features in our doctrinal and academic 
debates. It explains, most prominently, the persistence of the non-delegation 
doctrine as, at the very least, an aspirational ideal; why we refuse to inter it, 
once and for all. It also explains the unease that many have with deference 
that courts afford to agency interpretations of law. On the academic front, it 
accounts for the obsessive quality evident in efforts to square administrative 
 
63 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). One may find 
similar if less sharply expressed views in the majority opinion by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 362. 
64 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000). Other cases in this 
line, which develop the so-called “major questions” doctrine, include MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Most recently, the doctrine made an appearance in King v. 
Burwell, where the Court used the doctrine to deny the agency interpretive authority under Chevron, 
but not to deny the agency substantive regulatory authority. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  
65 Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1996). 
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lawmaking with democratic commitments. It also explains the critical 
position of John Hart Ely, who famously wondered, if information is what 
Congress lacked, what is to stop it from adapting to acquire more 
information?66 There is, after all, no constitutional limit on how Congress 
might expand its own capacity to collect and process information, so long as 
they do not wander into “executive” functions. Nor do they face much of a 
practical limit on their ability to build out institutional capacity: to start it, 
Members simply need to add a few lines to the relevant appropriations bill.67 
As will become clear, this theory’s answer to Ely’s question is that Congress’s 
binding limitation is not information. It is trust. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF TRUST AND LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS 
At root a belief that, expertise aside, legislative lawmaking is superior to 
administrative lawmaking explains much in our academic and doctrinal 
debates. Drawing on the methods of positive political theory, I argue that this 
belief is misplaced. In a complex society, with swirling currents of special 
interest group influence and consequent problems of trust, voters do not do 
very well by legislative lawmaking, questioning that form of lawmaking’s 
privileged status in our debates. Our political system has adapted to this 
problem of distrust, I argue, by building out administrative lawmaking 
capacity, which unlike legislative lawmaking, can be subject to demanding 
procedural constraints made credible by judicial enforcement. This analysis 
builds toward the implication that administrative lawmaking, if properly 
constrained, is paradoxically superior on democratic grounds to legislative 
lawmaking—in the sense that it produces a healthier polity and is more 
responsive to public interests. 
 
66 ELY, supra note 3, at 132-33. 
67 Of course, they still must comply with the Constitution’s Article I, section 7 provisions for 
lawmaking, but Presidents have difficulty vetoing appropriations bills as they invariably contain 
many provisions that he (or she) much favors. See, e.g., D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 713, 
714 (1988) (noting that “[e]ven under circumstances favorable to the president . . . his influence over 
final spending figures will be limited.”). More fully developed congressional capacity would also 
have overcome problems of collective action. Most plausibly, those would be overcome through 
extensive delegation to smaller groups of legislators who would be responsible for some relatively 
well-defined jurisdiction, along with norms of deference to those individuals. This is indeed not far 
from how the U.S. Congress (partially) solves problems of collectivity through the committee 
system; parliamentary systems, where the government is formed from parliamentary membership, 
might be seen as a radical extension of this same principle. 
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A. The Problem of Trust 
A fundamental problem of trust infects modern representative 
democracies. The problem is rooted in information: the public has poor 
information about at least two critical aspects of the political environment in 
virtually any complex democracy.68 First, the public does not know for certain 
whether its representative is “loyal” or “faithful” to their interests. The ways 
in which a representative may be unfaithful are manifold, but include 
prominently the possibility that the representative is corrupt, or captured by 
special interests, as well as the possibility that the representative is 
ideologically impure or inconsistent. Second, between various policy options, 
the public does not know for certain which is in their best interest. Although 
the first element of information (faithfulness) is likely an issue in any 
representative democracy, the absence of the second element of information 
only becomes acute in complex societies, in which the relationship between 
policies and material outcomes is often not clear to the public. Together, these 
factors produce distrust between the public and elected representatives. 
When voters observe a legislative policy choice, they wonder, “Did my 
representative act faithfully? Is this policy in my best interest?” This distrust may 
be greater or lesser in one environment or another, or one time or another, but it 
is sown deeply into the fabric of modern representative institutions. 
The first element of the problem relates to the characteristics of the 
representative himself. For example, the public often cannot be sure whether 
their representatives “truly” share their policy or ideological commitments. 
In recent years, Republican voters have been most questioning of the loyalty 
of their representatives,69 though Democrats also show early signs of the same 
dynamic.70 The public often also questions the connections between elected 
representatives and special interest groups.71 The public knows that special 
interest groups operate aggressively in the legislative arena—suggesting that 
they have some purchase on policy—but the public does not know if the 
representative rebuffed them or instead made an under-the-table deal with 
 
68 See infra Analytical Appendix. 
69 Edward Ashbee, Bewitched—The Tea Party Movement: Ideas, Interests and Institutions, 82 POL. 
Q. 157, 162 (2011) (describing, for example, efforts to install “purity” tests for candidates). 
70 E.g., Rebecca Savransky, Protesters Gather Outside Schumer’s Apartment, Urge Resistance to 
Trump Nominees, THEHILL (Feb. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/317272-
protesters-gather-outside-schumers-apartment-urge-him-to-resist-trump 
[https://perma.cc/MG7C-W6UT] (reporting that protesters gathered outside Senator Schumer’s 
apartment because they were skeptical he would resist President Trump’s cabinet picks). 
71 According to one recent survey, eighty-five percent of people believe that Members of 
Congress are more interested in serving special interest groups than the electorate. Americans on 
Domestic Policy, N.Y. TIMES | CBS NEWS POLL (May 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/05/01/us/domestic-poll-graphic.html [https://perma.cc/U2RA-SA7Y]. 
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them. Some types of legislators would rebuff the special interests; but many 
others would publicly declare themselves un-buyable just as they are being 
privately bought.72 In most cases, just as it is unclear whether a member was 
bought, it is impossible for the public to come to any clear view on such questions 
of the politician’s internal motivation or commitment to policy principles. 
The public, of course, attempts to sort out these difficult-to-observe 
characteristics of their elected representatives in a variety of ways. Classically, 
the media may be able to unearth information relevant to the legislator’s 
faithfulness, showing disturbing patterns of favor-giving by special interests, 
for example.73 Public interest groups, or the opposing campaign, might 
perform much the same role.74 The public readily assimilates such 
information.75 Voters also make inferences about unobservable characteristics 
based on observable behavior of politicians. Why do voters appear to place so 
much weight on the perceived “authenticity” of candidates? Why does it 
matter whether a politician received a DUI ten years ago? Or how much he 
spent on a haircut? Unlike questions of candidate health, for example, almost 
all such questions have virtually no direct bearing on the qualities of the 
candidate relevant to duties in office. But such questions nevertheless hold 
great interest because we use them to infer characteristics we cannot observe: 
an authentic candidate is less likely to flip flop or change ideological tunes; a 
DUI suggests that the candidate may be reckless or not care much about 
shared norms; a taste for expensive haircuts or clothes suggests that the 
candidate may be pliable by special interest lucre. But though such techniques 
have value, they also incompletely assuage public fears, in part because 
candidates manicure their histories and public performances in full 
knowledge of how voters make inferences based on them. 
The second element of information relates to the complexity of a society. 
In a complex society, the public will often not know with certainty whether a 
given policy is in its interest. This might also be true at times in less complex 
 
72 Only eight percent of the public, for instance, rates Members of Congress as being “high” or “very 
high” in honesty and ethical standards, the lowest of any surveyed profession. Americans Rate Healthcare 
Providers High on Honesty, Ethics, GALLUP (Dec. 19, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/200057/americans-
rate-healthcare-providers-high-honesty-ethics.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q26J-A6VF]. 
73 Classically, the muckraking journalists performed this role at the turn of the (last) century. 
See, e.g., LOUIS FILLER, THE MUCKRAKERS 9-10 (1976) (noting that muckrakers “savagely exposed 
grafting politicians,” and that for the “common people” this writing was “as gripping as it was 
educational”). Recently, a large literature has arisen studying the relationship between information 
provided in newspapers and political outcomes. See, e.g., Matthew Gentzkow et al., The Rise of the 
Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered, in CORRUPTION AND 
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 187, 203-06 (Edward L. Glaeser & 
Claudia Goldin eds., 2007). 
74 E.g., Lupia, infra note 79. 
75 Id. 
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societies, but it has been an acute problem in the United States since roughly 
the late nineteenth century.76 Then, the problem largely centered on 
managing novel economic interdependencies and corporate forms.77 For 
example, to achieve a fluid railroad network, what subsidies or legal 
concessions must we give to the railroads? If the legislature sets a railroad 
rate, is the rate too high? Too low? The responses to such questions depend 
on information that voters cannot easily obtain: e.g., candid testimony from 
railroads about their cost structure and business constraints. Today we have 
many similar questions about legislative choices: Should pharmaceutical drug 
X be regarded as safe and effective? What should the capital and margin 
requirements for financial institutions be? How do we evaluate the tradeoff 
of the social costs of pollution with the benefits of more affordable energy? 
Despite inevitable reassurances from decisionmakers that the decision is in 
the public’s best interest, the public appropriately discounts these 
declarations. Indeed, the answers to these questions also depend on 
information that is exceptionally challenging for voters to obtain. As such, at 
least in any complex democracy, when the public observes some legislative 
policy choice—for example, a legal concession to a developer, a bailout to a 
bank, or some form of financial regulation—it will often be unclear if the 
policy serves some defensible notion of the public interest, or instead the 
interests of a railroad, a bank, or some other narrow concern. 
As with the problem of faithfulness, voters attempt to determine the 
answer to the pressing questions via the usual sources: newspapers,78 trusted 
interest groups,79 and so on. But even with this help, the public cannot resolve 
much of the uncertainty that surrounds the policies in question. 
Thus, information is a critical problem in modern representative 
democracies: the public cannot be sure that its representatives are faithful, 
and they cannot independently assess if the policy in question serves their 
interest. In the first instance, this is a problem for voters. But voters can fire 
the legislator. And this in turn makes public distrust a problem for the 
legislator. If a voter does not trust the incumbent given these information 
problems, she may come to the view that she is better off electing a challenger 
who she believes has a greater likelihood of being faithful to her interests. 
This belief may turn out to be false, but that is not the important point for 
 
76 See Stiglitz, infra note 131. 
77 See, e.g., CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 146 (2007) (“To stimulate railroad 
expansion . . . town and county officials, state legislatures, and the U.S. Congress authorized untold 
millions of dollars in subsidies, bonds, and grants to the corporations.”). 
78 E.g., FILLER, supra note 73. 
79 Cf., Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California 
Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 69-72 (1994) (analyzing information shortcuts 
that voters use to confront complex problems). 
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the incumbent, for by the time that comes to light the incumbent will be out 
of office. The incumbent recognizes this electoral risk and, therefore, has an 
incentive to find a method of reducing public distrust.80 
B. Legislative Delegations 
Delegation of lawmaking authority to constitutional inferiors, subject to 
specified procedures and judicial review, resolves much of this problem of 
distrust.81 Delegations of this nature serve as a verification mechanism: the 
legislature states the statutory objective, and an administrative agency 
effectuates the objective by setting policy.82 But critically, the way in which 
the agency sets the policy is highly constrained and subject to scrutiny by 
external reviewers. These constraints and scrutiny allow the public a window 
into policymaking that is not possible in the pure legislative context, 
providing some faith that the policy serves its interests. Moreover, it is often 
in the elected representative’s interest to delegate to administrative agencies. 
The representative’s interest in doing so lies not necessarily in the “public 
good” but rather in the desire to be reelected.83 That is, public distrust is 
harmful to the representative because it increases the likelihood that the 
voters throw him out of office, and methods of reducing this distrust, such as 
delegation, help his reelection chances. 
That is the essence of the theory. Now consider in more detail how 
delegation might ameliorate voter distrust. With delegation, instead of 
directly legislating a policy outcome—say, approving a railroad rate, or a radio 
broadcasting license, or a pharmaceutical product—the legislature declares 
some outcome of interest and invests another entity, an administrative agency, 
with the authority to effectuate that outcome. For example, the legislature 
might tell an administrative agency to set railroad rates at a “fair and 
reasonable” level,84 or to approve “safe” and “effective” drugs,85 or to grant 
 
80 See infra Analytical Appendix. 
81 See infra Analytical Appendix. 
82 This understanding of agencies pursuing statutory objectives aligns well with Stack’s 
compelling purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the 
Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 894-96 (2015). 
83 This point marks a radical departure from other theories that admit the possibility of public 
interest regulation. In the present analysis, legislators nakedly seek self-preservation, not the public 
good. For other theories, see ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 132 (1938) 
(calling for the regulation of externalities when the “self-interest” of private actors fails to maximize 
public interests); CROLEY, supra note 22, at 153 (positing that legislators are “motivated at least in 
part to advance general interests”); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory 
State, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 401, 417 (2003) (generating a public interest theory of regulation that explains 
the inadequacy of court-based approaches). See infra Analytical Appendix. 
84 Hepburn Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-337, Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906). 
85 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012). 
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radio licenses in the public interest.86 The legislative action, therefore, is 
oriented towards abstract objectives rather than particularities of means. 
Many observers have criticized Congress for legislating by setting objectives 
rather than grappling with the particulars of policy,87 reflecting an 
“abdication” of legislative responsibility,88 but beyond being helpful 
politically to Members of Congress, this objectives-oriented style of 
legislating is in the voters’ interests. 
This follows from the critical fact that—unlike the legislature—the 
administrative agency sets the particularities of the policy in highly 
constrained ways. Agencies operate under the constraints of administrative 
procedures. When an agency wishes to issue a rule or order, it must follow 
specific procedures before doing so. Even if issuing an informal rule, the 
agency must give adequate notice of its intentions to issue a rule, along with 
an opportunity for the public to comment on the proposed rulemaking.89 
Under the APA, the procedures that apply to formal adjudications and 
rulemakings constrain further, requiring notice, but also for agencies to make 
a decision on the record, after a hearing that approximates that of a civil 
trial.90 Compelling agencies to follow such procedures encourages 
transparent and reason-based decisionmaking.91 An agency decision that 
seriously fails in its transparency or reason-giving—by failing to give 
adequate notice of the proposed rule, or by wholly ignoring one side of an 
argument or important pieces of evidence, respectively—is likely to be set 
aside on review. These procedural safeguards make it difficult for agencies to 
obscenely favor one side over the other, thereby reducing the odds of bald, 
wholesale corruption, and relieving public distrust in policymaking. 
The tempting rejoinder to this argument is that agency lawmaking falters 
both in its transparency and in its reason-based deliberative value. Much 
research, indeed, suggests that agencies strategically adapt their behavior to 
reduce transparency, for example, by shifting to one procedural form or 
another, as calculated to reduce judicial or public oversight.92 At least in the 
 
86 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2012). 
87 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 100 (arguing that delegation to administrative 
agencies allows Congress to both “state its goals” and “avoid the hard choices” in generating policy). 
88 See also Mathew D. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the 
Delegation Dilemma, 22 REG. 30, 37 (1999) (questioning the equivalence of delegation and 
abdication). 
89 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
90 §§ 556–57. 
91 See also, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1948-79 (noting the transparency and 
deliberative potential of the administrative state, as facilitated by procedures). 
92 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor 
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. REG. 257, 273-74 (1987) (arguing that the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration shifted from rulemaking to regulation via recall orders due to the challenges of 
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context of informal rulemakings—the subject of most recent scholarly 
attention—much research also suggests that the level of engagement with the 
public is limited. A common and perhaps dominant view among 
administrative law scholars, for instance, is that a rule is complete or nearly 
so by the time the agency issues its notice of proposed rulemaking.93 The 
supposed “deliberation” therefore that occurs following notice is largely for 
show. Similarly, even if a rule is set aside because an agency failed to 
acknowledge some point, the agency can often repair the rule by making 
superficial changes in the rule preamble, without substantive revision.94 
This is all true, so far as it goes. The transparency of agency 
decisionmaking is surely incomplete, and the level of explanation and 
deliberation in agency decisions is often wanting, and it seems increasingly 
so.95 But this rejoinder neglects two related points. 
First, agency decisionmaking is incomplete and wanting in these respects 
only within bounds. The ability of the agency to paper over substantive points 
of disagreement, for example, is limited. This much is suggested by the fact 
that agencies regularly withdraw rules after receiving adverse public 
comments,96 or issue multiple notices of proposed rulemaking in a single 
 
judicial review); Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 733, 765-69 (2016) (finding that agencies decrease the rate at which they report proposed rules 
to the Unified Agenda during times of divided government). Courts often attempt to curb such 
behavior, but whether they are, or can be, successful is an open question. See, e.g., Allentown Mack 
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (chastising the agency for articulating one 
rule and applying another against regulated entities). For a more general discussion, see Section III.A. 
93 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1495 (1992) 
(explaining that the “dialogue in which minds (and rules) are really changed” occurs “well in advance 
of a notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register”); Nou & Stiglitz, supra note 
92, at 743-44 (collecting references which propose that agencies have already resolved the crucial 
policy questions underlying rules before issuing notices of proposed rulemaking); see also Wendy 
Wagner, et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110 (2011) (“Indeed, the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is to 
survive judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed rule stage.”). For a 
counterview, see Cass Sunstein, The Future of E-rulemaking: Promoting Public Participation and 
Efficiency: Keynote Address at the Brookings Institute (Nov. 30, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
events/the-future-of-e-rulemaking-promoting-public-participation-and-efficiency/ 
[https://perma.cc/LN49-RC9X] (“Proposed rules are a way of obtaining comments on rules and the 
comments are taken exceedingly seriously.”). 
94 See, e.g., William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking? 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2000) (observing that "[w]hen rules were remanded, agencies tended to 
recover fairly quickly when recovery was necessary”). 
95 See Section IV.A (arguing that diminished transparency is the result of agencies shifting 
from adjudicatory activity to informal rulemaking). 
96 See, e.g., Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Hazardous Materials: Safety 
Requirements for External Product Piping on Cargo Tanks Transporting Flammable Liquids, 80 Fed. Reg. 
81,501, 81,502 (Dec. 30, 2015). 
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rulemaking effort. If an agency issues a rule entirely without giving its reasons 
for doing so, it is almost sure to be set aside on review; if an agency changes 
its story and gives different reasons for a regulatory decision on review than 
it gave at the agency level, the agency action is also likely to be set aside;97 if 
an agency avoids the notice and comment process of informal rulemaking by 
saying that it is merely offering “guidance,” it may likewise be set aside, and 
if it attempts to rely on this guidance as the basis for a decision in subsequent 
enforcement proceedings it is all the more likely to be set aside.98 All of this 
is to say that, true, agencies have discretion, and they surely often use this 
discretion to their own ideological or institutional ends, but also that they 
operate under constraints that bind in a meaningful way. Whatever discretion 
agencies have is limited. 
Now compare this to the baseline of transparency and reason-giving of 
the legislature. Congress does not need to give notice of intended legislation. 
It may hold a hearing prior to voting on a bill, or it may not, and any hearing 
is likely to be engineered for partisan or ideological rather than informational 
purposes.99 No individual or regulated party has a “right” to a meeting with 
Members or a committee. The equivalent of the legislative “record”—floor 
statements, the bill preamble, and the legislative reports—likewise reflect 
partisan engineering instead of the factual basis for legislation.100 And in any 
event, the validity of any legislation does not generally turn on the adequacy 
of the “record” or of the nexus between the stated objectives of legislation and 
chosen means.101 Under the highly deferential standard of review most 
 
97 See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (refusing to sustain an SEC order 
after noting that “the considerations urged here in support of the commission’s order were not those 
upon which its action was based”). 
98 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating 
FDA “action levels” that were accorded “substantive significance” in enforcement proceedings and 
were not generated pursuant to the notice and comment process). 
99 See, e.g., Tevi Troy, Congressional Hearings Aren’t What They Used to Be. Here’s How to Make 
Them Better, WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2015/10/21/congressional-hearings-arent-what-they-used-to-be-heres-how-to-
make-them-better/ [https://perma.cc/K427-SZ3R] (“These days, hearings tend to be seen as partisan 
affairs, and coverage is often limited to C-SPAN and select cable news channels.”). 
100 See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, et al., Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory 
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 8 (1994) (noting that “[p]robably the 
most persuasive argument against using legislative history in statutory interpretation is that 
politicians sometimes misrepresent their actual policy preferences”). 
101 On review of an equal protection claim, for example, absent a suspect classification or 
fundamental right, courts generically apply the rational basis standard, which is exceptionally 
deferential, and requires only that the law serve some conceivable rational purpose—what the 
legislature actually thought it was doing is largely beside the point. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. 
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“Where . . . there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our 
inquiry is at an end.”); see also id. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring) (deriding the “conceivable basis” 
formulation, arguing that the “Constitution requires something more than merely a ‘conceivable’ or 
‘plausible’ explanation for the unequal treatment”). Now compare that standard of review to the 
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commonly applied to legislation, legislation will be upheld if supported by any 
conceivable rational basis that a court might later conjure—there need be no 
evidence that the legislature actually contemplated any rationale for the 
legislation.102 In short, even if the transparency and deliberation required of 
agencies is not complete, the requirement is virtually absent for legislatures.103 
Legislative adherents do not deny that the legislature is subject to fewer 
procedural constraints than agencies. The conventional normative basis for 
legislative decisions is—rather than procedural integrity—the superior 
democratic foundations of the legislature. Yet just as the procedural 
safeguards of the APA remain incomplete, the democratic credentials of the 
legislature also remain incomplete. Notably, voters suffer from important 
information problems in a modern representative democracy—voters cannot 
be sure that the people they have elected represent their interests rather than 
the interests of some narrow, possibly opposed concern. The main contention 
of this Article, indeed, is that the transparency and deliberation fostered by 
the superior procedural credentials of administrative agencies helps to resolve 
the information problems—the democratic deficit—that inhere to modern 
representative legislatures. 
 
generic standard that courts apply to administrative actions, the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
which, if anything, scholars criticize for being overly harsh and searching. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, 
Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2000) 
(“[J]udicial review ineluctably produces pathological consequences.”). 
102 See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1849 (2015) (observing that values such as reason-giving are 
“almost entirely eschewed [by courts] on the legislation side,” but given considerable attention on 
questions of administrative lawmaking); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: 
Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19 (2001) (“We have in 
crucial ways given up on the project of rationality as applied to legislative action. As a constitutional 
matter we do not require that the legislature have a ‘rational basis’ for its actions, only that we could 
imagine one.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 967-
70 (2007) (observing a “judicial reluctance to impose an uphold-only-for-reasons-given requirement” 
with respect to legislation, and noting the complications for the separation of powers that that form 
of review would imply). See generally Fritz, 449 U.S. 166. 
103 Some scholars have called for courts to try to enforce forms of legislative due process. See, 
e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 1915, 1971 (2011) (arguing that courts should review legislative process); Gluck et al., supra 
note 102, at 1858 (noting that “courts are capable of, and sometimes interested in, engaging more 
with the lawmaking process,” but have historically avoided the question of whether Congress 
engaged in legislative due process); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 
222 (1976) (explaining that judicial review of legislative due process would mean “that a judge is to 
assess the challenged law in relation to actual, not merely conjectural, purposes, and that he is 
similarly to gauge the reasonableness of doubtful means by realistic materials in the record and not 
by hypothetical rationalizations”). I agree that moves of this sort would likely be beneficial; however, 
for the reasons discussed in Section II.C, I am skeptical that courts can credibly police legislative 
procedures in a way similar to the way they police administrative procedures. 
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C. Judicial Review: Credibility and Constitutional Inferiors 
At this point it is natural to ask—why does the legislature not procedurally 
constrain itself? That is, why do we not have a Legislative Procedure Act? The 
act would specify procedures for legislative actions that inspire trust: for 
example, requiring the legislature to develop a record before making a 
decision, requiring some limited form of rationality, establishing formalized 
hearings and perhaps barring ex parte meetings between special interest 
groups and legislators. Continuing the administrative analogy, it would also 
invest courts with the ability to review legislative actions for rationality and 
procedural irregularities. That scenario would seem to constitute an 
indomitable fusion of democratic legitimacy and procedural legitimacy. 
Of course, we have nothing of the sort. The legislature, as I suggest, is 
essentially free to do as it wishes. The Houses of Congress have procedural 
rules, as permitted by the Constitution,104 but they are both self-generated 
and, for reasons discussed below, almost entirely self-enforced. Moreover, 
there is no requirement for rationality from outside or inside of Congress. 
One, indeed, need not look further than the titles of legislation to observe 
the complete vacuum of any norm, much less enforceable requirement, for 
rationality in the legislature. Here, outlandish exaggeration is the norm,105 
absurdity not uncommon.106 
The key to understanding why no Legislative Procedure Act exists—and 
to understanding the unlikely virtue of administrative lawmaking—is 
enforceability. What would happen if Members violated a procedural rule? If 
a leading Member had ex parte contacts with special interest groups, for 
example? How would the rule be enforced? 
One possibility is that the legislature would enforce its own rules. But the 
history on this front, even on charges far more serious than disallowed ex 
parte contacts, is not encouraging. Consider the history of the U.S. Senate. 
Since the founding, the Senate has formally expelled fifteen Members, but 
the body did so only in truly extraordinary circumstances: one case of treason 
shortly after independence, and fourteen cases of support for the Confederate 
 
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
105 Richard Simon, Congress Turns Bill Titles into Acts of Exaggeration, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/19/nation/la-na-0620-titles-20110620 
[https://perma.cc/6PKY-8AK2] (noting an Affordable Care Act repeal bill entitled “Revoke 
Excessive Policies that Encroach on American Liberties Act”). 
106 E.g., Federal Water Quality Protection Act, S. 1140, 114th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, 
Apr. 30, 2015), in fact was designed to “cripple” an EPA rule that expanded the reach of the Clean 
Water Act. See generally Editorial, G.O.P. Assault on Environmental Laws, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/opinion/gop-assault-on-environmental-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/85LU-ZPDF]. 
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rebellion during the Civil War.107 Facing charges, a number of senators 
resigned from office, but even this has occurred only five times since the 
founding: three cases of corruption, two of those after criminal convictions; 
one case of alleged election fraud; and one case consisting of equal parts favor 
peddling and lurid sexual misconduct.108 All in all, the Senate does not seem 
particularly active in self-policing. Incredibly, the U.S. House of 
Representatives is even less assiduous. It has expelled only five Members in 
its history: three for support of the South during the Civil War, and two 
bribery-related charges.109 Thus, cases of congressional self-policing are rare 
and tend to involve highly visible and obvious violations of rules. The idea 
that the legislature would self-police with respect to ex parte contacts, much 
less to undue laxity in ends-means rationality strains belief. 
For this reason, credible enforcement in this area must come externally.110 
The problem is that the most natural external enforcer, the Judiciary, cannot 
itself credibly enforce procedures or standards of rationality against the 
legislature. It is indeed only a modest stretch to say that the courts’ 
justiciability doctrines exist precisely to permit courts respectably to avoid 
deciding such questions. 
It is important not to overstate the firmness or completeness of this 
point—the Court is not consistent in applying justiciability doctrines,111 as 
many have observed.112 And individual doctrines ebb and flow in influence.113 
But they also all serve essentially the same objective of providing the option 
of face-saving abstention,114 and so even if one doctrine or another falls from 
 
107 U.S. Senate: Expulsion and Censure, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm [https://perma.cc/8UHG-CVSA]. 
108 Id. 
109 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL31382, EXPULSION, CENSURE, REPRIMAND, 
AND FINE: LEGISLATIVE DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 21 (2016). 
110 For a sympathetic take, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 805, 808 (2010) (arguing that Members of Congress face few incentives to self-police 
or follow rules). 
111 See, e.g., Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political 
Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1345, 1348-53 (1990). 
112 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) (noting that 
standing has long been regarded as “incoherent” and “permeated with sophistry” (citation omitted)). 
113 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (tracing the rise of the 
political question doctrine in its constitutional and prudential forms, and arguing that it is much 
diminished as a result of rising judicial supremacy). 
114 See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring) 
(observing that, “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only standing but mootness, 
ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, 
to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the 
constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our 
kind of government.”). 
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favor, or if the facts of a given case fit oddly with precedent on that or another 
doctrine, the likelihood is high that courts can avail themselves of some route 
to avoid a decision on the merits. When it comes to a question of the internal 
operations of the legislative branch that the courts wish to sidestep, what 
today, on these facts, is decided on the basis of the political question 
doctrine,115 tomorrow, on those facts, might be decided on the basis of 
legislator or generic standing.116 
And though it is important not to overstate the completeness of judicial 
abstention, it is also important not to understate what judicial enforcement 
of any Legislative Procedure Act would entail. It would mean judicial entries 
into the legislative process, not just in the occasional Powell or Nixon,117 but 
instead a regular, near-constant involvement of the courts in the legislative 
process, much as we have with respect to the administrative process. Someone 
will always be aggrieved by a legislative action, and they will challenge on 
procedural or substantive grounds, arguing that the legislation fails a 
rationality test. It is not credible that courts would be able to engage in this 
type of oversight for a period of any length. Occasionally, courts may 
challenge and police the political branches, but their ability to do so on a 
continued basis is sharply limited;118 the few instances in which courts have 
 
115 E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (finding the political question 
doctrine to apply to the manner in which the Senate “try” an impeachment); see also Stack, supra 
note 102, at 967-70 (discussing the difficulty of judicial review of the legislative process). 
116 E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815-18 (1997) (finding that Members of Congress did not 
have standing to challenge the constitutional status of the Line Item Veto Act, despite the fact that 
the Act authorized such suits); Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(holding that plaintiffs, including both Members of Congress and private citizens, did not have 
standing to challenge the constitutional status of the filibuster); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 
110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing either as Members of Congress 
or as taxpayers to sue the President for violating the War Powers Resolution). 
117 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226 (holding that the procedures of a Senate impeachment trial 
represent a nonjusticiable political question); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489, 550 (1969) 
(overcoming the political question doctrine and issuing a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff had 
been unlawfully excluded from a House seat to which he had been elected). 
118 This, of course, is an old idea. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, 
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous 
[branch] . . . . The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislat[ur]e not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules 
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on 
the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either 
of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution 
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the 
efficacy of its judgments. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean ed. 1788). 
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forgotten this lesson and aggressively countered the political branches have 
led to near-disasters for the Judiciary.119 
Among other things, this means that it is highly unlikely that courts will 
enforce procedural rules that apply within Congress.120 An indispensable 
corollary of this point is that distrust in direct legislative lawmaking is 
essentially irreducible, as the dominant verification mechanism—procedures 
and at least minimal substantive rationality, supported by judicial review—is 
not meaningfully available in that context. 
With all of this in mind, now consider administrative agencies. The great 
virtue of administrative agencies is that—unlike the legislature—a credible 
means of procedural enforcement exists. Indeed, the very fact that 
administrative agencies represent constitutionally awkward, distinctly lesser 
entities that scholars and jurists regard with natural suspicion is, 
paradoxically, a boon to their credibility as policymakers. The very fact that 
they create a fundamental tension with our self-conception as a democracy,121 
that they combine constitutional functions more typically separated, or at 
least more typically combined less obviously, in other words, is important to 
their success.122 
Those awkward features assist because courts cannot help but be offended 
by them—they invite judicial scrutiny and willingness to meddle. As such, if 
an agency skips a procedural step, courts have no problem remanding the rule 
or order so that the agency may comply with the procedure; if the agency fails 
to explain itself, or behaves irrationally or arbitrarily, courts have no trouble 
 
119 See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” 
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966) (chronicling the history of the Court’s challenges to New Deal 
programs, and President Roosevelt’s evolving plans for curbing the Judiciary); see also TOM S. 
CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 108-09 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2011) 
(demonstrating that congressional court curbing proposals increase in times of public opposition to 
the Court, inducing self-restraint by the Court.); Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court 
Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009) (arguing that the Court exercises 
self-restraint in the face of an adversarial Congress, fearing loss of public support and legitimacy). 
120 See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226 (refusing to resolve a claim involving the Senate’s procedural rules). 
121 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) (observing that, “Like an intriguing but awkward 
family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is handed down from generation to generation of 
administrative law scholars”). 
122 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
530-31 (2015) (noting that agencies combine powers of the three branches, and that this induces 
concern among many observers). See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship 
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009) (analyzing the 
relationship between the separation of powers generally and separations “internal” to administrative 
agencies). 
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vacating and remanding the action.123 This is all possible because agencies are 
regarded as awkward, suspected, constitutional inferiors with no inherent 
legitimacy. 
In this way, whereas meaningful judicial review is repelled in the 
legislative context,124 it flows naturally, some indeed argue too naturally,125 in 
the administrative context. Of course, review of agency actions is not costless 
for any party, and its implications are far-reaching and complex,126 but one 
underappreciated benefit of review—the central one in this account—is that 
it supports credibility in administrative procedures and at least a “thin” form 
of rationality in administrative lawmaking that is all but impossible to achieve 
in legislative lawmaking.127 
Thus, for delegation to serve its function of ameliorating public distrust, 
it is important for administrative agencies to represent constitutional inferiors 
that courts may police without fearing for their own status in our 
constitutional system. The manner of congressional delegations, along with 
administrative procedures, makes this relationship clear. It is well understood 
in our system that agencies have no inherent authority and that any authority 
they have derives from statute.128 Moreover, the political branches have 
clearly subordinated administrative agencies through the judicial review 
provisions of the APA, notably giving a cause of action to anyone aggrieved 
by agency action.129 Those provisions open the door to review and call on 
courts, for example, to set aside any agency action that is arbitrary and 
capricious.130 
 
123 Kevin Stack provides a nice illustration of this point, explaining how the agency reason-
giving that courts require via Chenery roots in constitutional concerns over non-delegation. Stack, 
supra note 102, at 967-70. 
124 As one court put it, “The agencies certainly have a good deal of discretion in expressing 
the basis of a rule, but the agencies do not have quite the prerogative of obscurantism reserved to 
legislatures.” United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977). 
125 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1999) (arguing that “[a]lthough a call for abolishing judicial review of rulemaking 
may be a new one, the case has a strong analytical pedigree”). 
126 See, e.g., Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 92; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) (arguing that “the judicial branch is responsible for 
most of the ossification of the rulemaking process”). 
127 On this notion of “thin” rationality, see Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality 
Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (2016). 
128 See Thomas W. Merill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004). 
129 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
130 § 706(2)(A). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND COMPLICATIONS 
The theory may explain a great deal, but it also raises some questions and 
carries implications that call out to be examined. In a separate effort, I address 
the historical aspects of this theory, using it to understand progressive era 
delegations of authority;131 the project also entails an empirical component.132 
This Article is not the place for those exercises. Here, I wish to develop three 
implications of the theory: two related to the nature of administrative 
procedures, and one related to the areas in which we observe more or less 
delegated authority. 
A. Fairness and Administrative Procedures 
A central dividend of this theory of the administrative state is that it 
provides a foundation for an answer to another major question: why do we 
have administrative procedures? Scholars have advanced two basic types of 
theories for administrative procedures: a traditional normative school of 
thought, which argues they exist to ensure fairness and promote the 
legitimacy of the administrative state;133 and a positive theory school of 
thought, which argues that they exist as tools by which Congress might 
exercise control over agencies through decentralized monitoring.134 This idea 
of public distrust refashions our understanding by suggesting a positive rather 
than normative rationale for fairness and legitimacy in our understanding of 
procedures. 
Recent historical research has emphasized that the objectives of fairness 
and legitimacy were central to those crafting administrative procedures.135 A 
central concern of the drafters of the APA, indeed, was fairness,136 a fact 
 
131 Edward H. Stiglitz, Administrative Origins in Democratic Distrust (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
132 For the first published empirical paper in this project, see Edward H. Stiglitz, Cost–Benefit 
Analysis and Public Sector Trust, SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (on file 
with author) (providing an empirical analysis substantiating the “connection between cost-benefit 
analysis and public sector trust”). 
133 JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 67 (2012) (noting that the Attorney General’s Committee, which 
heavily influenced the APA, “offered recommendations intended not to strictly limit the agencies 
but to help them improve their overall operations and gain legitimacy in the public’s eyes”). 
134 E.g., McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 34, at 342 (discussing how political 
concerns influence administrative processes and guide “agencies to make decisions that are 
consistent with the previous legislative coalition”). 
135 GRISINGER, supra note 133, at 5-6 (providing a “political history of administrative law,” and 
observing that “[l]egalism and fairness were tightly linked, and parties inside and outside the government 
turned to administrative rules and procedures to ensure that administrators acted fairly.”). 
136 Id. at 60 (noting that the APA’s “drafters consistently argued that the APA was a significant 
reform that would improve the fairness of administrative governance”). 
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reflected in the preamble of the APA itself.137 Some decades later, even as 
administrative procedures had evolved considerably since Congress passed 
the APA, Professor Stewart argued in his magisterial article that “the function 
of administrative law is . . . the provision of a surrogate political process to 
ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the 
process of administrative decision.”138 Before the APA, in the APA itself, and 
in its subsequent evolution, a focus on fairness has been a constant in 
administrative procedures. 
Legitimacy, likewise, tends to go in hand with discussions of procedures 
and fairness. It is indeed notable that the drafters of the APA and cognate 
systems of administrative procedures not only cared about fairness, but 
critically that the public perceives procedures as fair, thus feeding the 
legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking. Agencies crafted their pre-
APA, self-generated rules of procedure, for instance, with an eye towards the 
public’s view of their fairness.139 The Attorney General’s 1941 report on 
procedures, an important influence on the subsequent APA, similarly 
reflected pervasive concern with public perceptions.140 
In this way, the observation that procedures support fairness and 
legitimacy is far from novel, but often unanswered is why fairness and 
legitimacy matter. Most often, scholars either take it as self-evident that they 
matter, or equivalently regard them as normative ideals in themselves. In 
other words, fairness and legitimacy matter, because we care about fairness 
and legitimacy. Thus, as McNollGast offer their seminal positive analysis of 
administrative procedures, they put to the side the traditional view of 
procedures as “a means of assuring fairness and legitimacy in decisions by 
administrators . . . protect[ing] against autocratic and capricious decisions by 
government officials.”141 For most positive theorists, if fairness and legitimacy 
 
137 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (providing in its full 
title, “An act to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure”). 
138 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1670 (1975). 
139 See, e.g., GRISINGER, supra note 133, at 76 (quoting from a study of the ICC that “a 
regulatory body must be especially solicitous that the public should believe it to be competent, 
careful, and fair, and if this end can be furthered by procedural concessions which to some extent 
lower efficiency the gain may well be worth the price” (citation omitted)); see also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 461, 462-63 (2003) (arguing that preventing arbitrariness is central to the legitimacy of the 
administrative state). For a more recent example of this sort, see Emily Hammond & David L. 
Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside Out, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 330 (2013) (discussing the “inside-out” efforts of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency to promote legitimacy and check arbitrariness). 
140 GRISINGER, supra note 133, at 67 (noting that the Attorney General’s Committee report 
“offered recommendations intended . . . to help [agencies] . . . gain legitimacy in the public’s eyes”). 
141 McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 34, at 244. 
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reflect anything of substance in our understanding of administrative 
procedures—rather than a distraction—they do so by rootless normative appeal. 
The trust-based theory of delegation in this Article maps a positive 
understanding of why fairness and legitimacy matter in administrative 
procedures. In particular, this analysis indicates how fairness and legitimacy 
matter in procedures, not as normative ideals, but as critical accompaniments 
of delegated authority, designed to ameliorate distrust between voters and 
elected representatives. Procedures of fairness and transparency constrain 
administrative decisionmaking and endow it with verifiability that, though 
incomplete, far surpasses what might credibly be achieved through direct 
legislation. Fairness and legitimacy, in other words, are indispensable to the 
legislature’s (self-interested) efforts to escape the problem of public distrust 
that arises in modern representative democracies. 
Administrative procedures surely represent a complex body of rules,142 
and inevitably those who supported the passage of the APA did so for a 
variety of reasons. Unease with unchecked bureaucratic power was, and is, 
widespread, and administrative procedures undoubtedly have roots in 
political control, as in the dominant understanding among positive 
scholars.143 But it is a mistake to regard fairness and legitimacy as empty 
rhetorical flourishes, or as reflecting free-floating normative ideals. They 
instead represent essential features of procedures that enhance the fates of 
voter and politician alike, and without which delegations of lawmaking 
authority would be politically impossible or have far less value. 
B. Historical Sequencing and Procedures 
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, well after the 
massive administrative transformation of the New Deal, and decades 
following the important progressive era delegations. This sequence seemingly 
raises a challenge for the theory of this Article. After all, delegations serve a 
political purpose, in this account, precisely because they offer credible 
procedural regularity that cannot be achieved in the legislative context. What, 
then, to think of the fact that the APA came after, not before, so many major 
delegations of lawmaking authority? 
 
142 E.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 10-11 (arguing that “[t]he framework for 
understanding most national lawmaking and much national adjudication in this country is no longer 
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution, but is instead the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
which codified the new public order.”). 
143 For example, consistent with this view, Mills Logan said of the Walter–Logan bill, a failed 
predecessor of the APA, that it would stop “the entire subordination of both the legislative and judicial 
branches of the Federal Government to the executive branch.” DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S 
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 133 (2014). 
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It is important to note three points. First, though Congress passed the 
APA in 1946, it is error to suggest that Congress first then contemplated 
procedures. Indeed, far from it. Though the solution of delegation to the 
problem of distrust no doubt came haltingly and only half-knowingly, as an 
evolution rather than as engineered, many of the initial delegations of 
authority came with agency-specific procedures that represented early 
prototypes of what eventually became the APA. Consider, for instance, the 
Steamboat Safety Act of 1852, which Professor Mashaw carefully details in 
his recent entry on early “administrative law.”144 This Act, which pre-dated 
the APA by nearly a century, delegated authority to a board to inspect and 
license steamboats for safety145—during this period, steamboats, a major form 
of public transportation, had the unfortunate tendency to explode.146 
However, with the delegation of authority came administrative procedures. 
The statute called on inspectors to certify vessels for seaworthiness, signing 
a statement if approving the boat, and in the event of a denial, the inspectors 
were required to “state, in writing, and sign the same, their reasons for their 
disapproval.”147 The statute, further, provided for an appeals process, allowing 
for a supervisor to consider the case “anew” if the party appealed within thirty 
days of the initial decision and submitted the inspector’s written reasons.148 
By the turn of the century, it seems it was fairly standard for Congress to 
accompany delegations with procedures. The Hepburn Act of 1906, for 
instance, which dramatically expanded the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s (ICC) authority, including, for the first time, unambiguous 
ratemaking authority,149 featured an impressive suite of procedural 
 
144 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 187-208 
(2012); see also John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 7 TECH. & CULTURE 1, 3 (1966) 
(arguing that, in response to the dangers of steamboat engines, “Congress passed the first positive 
regulatory legislation and created the first agency empowered to supervise and direct the internal 
affairs of a sector of private enterprise in detail,” a trend that led to the growth of federal power and 
other agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission). For another excellent entry on pre-
twentieth century regulation, see generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW 
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (discussing nineteenth-century 
developments in agency procedures from fire safety regulations to free market regulations). 
145 See MASHAW, supra note 144. 
146 For several hundred pages of gruesome—one hopes sensationalized—accounts of many 
steamboat disasters, see JAMES T. LLOYD, LLOYD’S STEAMBOAT DIRECTORY, AND DISASTERS 
ON THE WESTERN WATERS 225-27 (1856) (describing, for example, the explosion of the Louisiana 
in 1849 near New Orleans, observing that, though many died “hideous[ly]” in the explosion, “the 
fate of many who still lived was more shocking and distressing than the ghastly and disfigured 
corpses of those whose sufferings were terminated by death”). 
147 Regulation of Steamboats, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 66 (1852); see also MASHAW, supra note 144, at 
195 (“So far as I have been able to ascertain, this is the first statute at the national level to require 
written reasons for an administrative decision”). 
148 Ch. 106, 10 Stat. at 67. 
149 Interstate Commerce Regulations, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 589 (1906). 
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requirements. In the event of a complaint against a carrier, the ICC must 
“make a report in writing,” and in the event of a damages awards, “shall 
include the findings of fact on which the award is made.”150 The report “shall 
be entered of record, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the party who 
may have complained, and to any common carrier that may have been 
complained of.”151 The Act further provided for a “full hearing,”152 and though 
that term was not well-defined in the statute, its meaning was clear enough 
to courts. Such a hearing, the Court declared in ICC v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Co., “conferred the privilege of introducing testimony, and at the 
same time imposed the duty [on the ICC] of deciding in accordance with the 
facts proved.” 153 And though the statute likewise did not establish a generic 
standard of review,154 Congress plainly provided avenues for judicial review 
of Commission orders. The keystone standard of review that emerged from 
this judicial review, the substantial evidence standard,155 was conceived as 
somewhat more deferential than the “weight of the evidence” standard,156 but 
certainly constituted more than a free pass for agencies.157 With some 
modification, this standard of review later made its way into the APA.158 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913). 
154 On orders calling for damages, the Hepburn Act provided that “the findings and order of 
the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 589, 
590 (1906). The prima facie standard is itself not self-explanatory, but it appears not to require much 
deference from courts. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. at 90 (noting a government 
argument that the 1887 Act that established the ICC rendered its orders “only prima facie correct,” 
and that the Hepburn Act, which did not apply that standard to orders not dealing with damages, 
therefore envisioned a more deferential standard of review on such matters.). For other types of 
orders, Congress was even less clear. If a carrier refused to obey an ICC order, the Commission or 
an injured party may seek enforcement in a circuit court. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. at 591 (“If, upon such 
hearing as the court may determine to be necessary, it appears that the order was regularly made 
and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce obedience 
to such order by a writ of injunction, or other proper process . . . .”).  
155 See, e.g., E. Blythe Stason, “Substantial Evidence” in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 
1026, 1029-30 (1941) (noting that “the substantial evidence rule is today gradually being accepted by 
the courts as a controlling guide,” and that that standard emerged from ICC cases in which the 
statute provided no clear standard of review of facts). 
156 See, e.g., ERNST, supra note 143, at 4. 
157 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (noting that 
“[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”); Louisville, 227 U.S. at 91, 98-100. 
158 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). The APA requires the court to review the “whole record,” 
seemingly calling for a more searching review than courts had at times applied previously. § 706. 
On the modification, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (observing that 
“[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 
its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in [the APA] that courts consider the 
whole record.”). But opposing the notion that the “whole record” requirement added much, see 
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A second critical observation is that agencies themselves generate a 
substantial body of procedures.159 This was true, as Professor Mashaw notes, 
even before the APA provided scaffolding for additional self-generated 
procedures. The reason that agencies develop these procedures—that is, that 
they constrain themselves—is not entirely clear. Perhaps agencies have some 
self-conception of how administration “should” occur.160 Perhaps, as agencies 
grow in size, they must develop procedures more for reasons of internal self-
control and self-governance.161 Or perhaps they develop procedures in 
attempts to forestall the external imposition of procedures by courts or 
Congress that they feel might be ill-fitting or unduly onerous.162 The 
motivation of self-generated procedures is indeed of great interest, yet what 
matters most is that self-generated procedures exist in substance and quantity, 
and effectuate many of the values associated with the APA. Indeed, Professor 
Mashaw observes that, due to these self-generated rules of procedure, “the 
modern administrative lawyer would find little surprising in the 
administrative adjudicatory process utilized in the late nineteenth century.”163 
The third observation builds on the first two. To a substantial degree, the 
APA, as passed, represented a codification of the practices and procedures 
that already existed in agencies, largely either by virtue of their self-
constraint, their organic statutes, or judicial influence.164 The APA’s 
procedures for formal adjudications, then the dominant channel of agency 
activity, largely resemble those of a civil trial, and were clearly presaged by 
the notice and “full hearing” requirements of the Hepburn Act and other 
 
Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 589 
(1951) (concluding that the substantial evidence standard of review “is but little more than a 
codification of the Consolidated Edison case”); see also supra note 157. 
159 For an important statement of this point, see Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009) (observing that, “Strangely absent from [standard] accounts 
is a ubiquitous phenomenon: administrative agencies routinely ‘self-regulate’ . . . . They voluntarily 
constrain their discretion”), and MASHAW, supra note 144, at 277-82 (discussing self-generated 
“internal administrative law”). 
160 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 144, at 112 (“Administrators, because of the imperatives of 
responsible administration, shrink from unconstrained discretion vested in themselves and fear the 
centrifugal effects of discretion vested in subordinates.”); see also Hammond & Markell, supra note 
139 (exploring the features of the EPA that create “inside-out” legitimacy as an alternative to judicial 
review). 
161 See generally MASHAW, supra note 144. 
162 See, e.g., GRISINGER supra note 133, at 76 (noting that by the time of the APA, “Most 
agencies and commissions already adhered to judicially defined standards of due process and 
employed quasi-judicial procedures in their work, a result of agencies scrambling to satisfy reviewing 
courts and prove their lawfulness to the public in previous years”). 
163 MASHAW, supra note 144, at 254. 
164 See, e.g., GRISINGER, supra note 133, at 77 (observing that the APA standards “came largely 
from the existing practices of the agencies and from the doctrines of administrative law created and 
articulated by the courts over the past six decades, rather than the [APA] itself”). 
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congressional actions.165 Much the same holds for the review provisions in the 
APA. I have already noted one important area where this is the case: the 
standard that courts apply to agency findings of fact, a standard that largely 
developed in the courts as they reviewed ICC orders without clear guidance 
from Congress on the appropriate standard of review.166 Naturally, this point 
on the continuity of the APA can be overstated. The APA introduced 
procedures and requirements in a number of important areas,167 and even 
under this continuity thesis, the APA brought the laggard agencies into line 
with the more procedurally conscious agencies.168 But it is perhaps easier still 
to overstate the significance of the innovations brought about by the APA. 
Congress was not drafting against a status quo in which agency officials 
exercised freewheeling, unconstrained discretion. Congress, instead, was 
drafting against a backdrop of administrative procedures and standards of 
review that had developed organically and piecemeal for many years, and 
intensively so for roughly half a century.169 
All of this indicates that the cornerstones of procedures and judicial 
review existed, or were under active development, by the time of the first 
major progressive era delegations. It took time to work out the elaborate 
structure of the APA; but long before the APA, Congress, along with agencies 
themselves, began to spin out an intuition of the procedures and styles of 
review that profitably accompany delegations of lawmaking authority. 
 
165 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
166 The central question during this period seems to have been how courts would review 
findings of fact rather than law. Fact finding was then seen as a critical area of agency discretion. 
Justice Hughes famously wrote as a warning, “Let me find the facts for the people of my country, 
and I care little who lays down the general principles.” Charles Evan Hughes, Important Work of 
Uncle Sam’s Lawyers, 17 AM. B. ASS’N J. 237, 238 (1931). At the same time, it seems that it was 
generally assumed that courts would review questions of law at this point. In his magisterial entry 
on review of administrative action, Louis L. Jaffe observes a trend of judicial deference from the 
1870s, followed by a “sudden and dramatic turn” in the 1902 case of School of Magnetic Healing v. 
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), establishing a sort of presumption of reviewability. LOUIS L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 339 (1965). This presumption “was reinforced 
in the Twenties and Thirties by a judicial zeal, often excessive, to contain administrative action.” Id. 
at 342-43; see also MASHAW, supra note 144, at 248 (noting that, under Jaffe’s account, there was 
“something like a general presumption of the reviewability of administrative action for legal error” 
by the early 1900s.). 
167 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 158, at 590 (lauding, for instance, the requirement of independent 
trial examiners in certain contexts). 
168 E.g., GRISINGER, supra note 133, at 77 (noting that the APA was a “statement of best practices”). 
169 Indeed, one observer writing shortly after Congress passed the APA leavened his 
assessment of the Act by saying, “Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that the APA is 
altogether useless.” Parker, supra note 158, at 590. 
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C. Heterogeneous Policies: Tax and Financial Regulation 
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to administrative agencies far 
more in some areas than in others. Observers commonly note, for instance, 
that Congress rarely delegates fundamental lawmaking authority in tax 
policy.170 Much the same might be said of fiscal policy more generally.171 By 
comparison, observers marvel at the high level of delegation in other policy 
areas, questioning why Congress needed to delegate matters that might have 
been resolved within the institution. For instance, many have questioned why 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd–Frank) called on financial regulatory agencies to issue some 400 
rulemakings.172 
The theory of this Article suggests answers to these questions. There is 
relatively little delegation in the fiscal realm because the public trusts 
Congress in this area, at least in the politically relevant sense.173 That is, voters 
can generally determine whether a given fiscal policy is in their interest or 
not. They ask: Does my tax rate increase? Am I paying more now than I used 
to? Am I receiving more transfers than I used to? Am I receiving more now 
than I used to? For better or worse, these questions largely motivate voter 
judgments in fiscal policy,174 and hence dictate fiscal policy. That voters can 
 
170 See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235, 248 
(2015) (noting that “[i]t is commonly understood that U.S. tax policy is, to a remarkable (and 
unusual) extent, determined by Congress not only in its broad outlines but also in its details”). 
171 E.g., Lars Calmfors, Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We 
Learn from Monetary Policy?, 49 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 319, 334 (2003) (noting that the delegation 
of fiscal policy would be a “very far-reaching institutional reform”). 
172 Dodd–Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK (Sept. 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/
files/September2014_Dodd.Frank_.Progress.Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ5B-EW4B] (noting 
“398 total rulemaking requirements” in Dodd–Frank). For a thoughtful assessment of this issue, see 
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF 
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 90 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) (doubting the conventional 
information rationale for delegation in the context of Dodd–Frank). 
173 The Appropriations Clause provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but 
in Consequence of Appropriations made by law,” Art. I., § 9, cl. 7, and that provision might be read 
to limit Congress’s constitutional authority to delegate fiscal policy. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of 
the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343, 1383 (1988) (arguing that the Clause imposes a duty on Congress to 
identify the object of the funding and limit funding in time and amount). Even if the Appropriations 
Clause implies these requirements, however, they would not plainly rule out fiscal delegation, except 
in the most open-ended formats (e.g., without limits on time, objects, or amount). 
174 This idea has a long history. For early and influential works analyzing this trend, see V.O. 
KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 61 (1966) 
(developing a theory of retrospective voting), and MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 179 (1981) (concluding that “it is clear that changes in 
financial situation had the expected effect on the vote” in the 1974 congressional elections). For a 
recent effort that largely corroborates these earlier perspectives on so-called “pocketbook” voting, 
see Andrew J. Healy et al., Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from 
Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey (Oct. 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
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answer them natively means that there is little distrust and little need for 
delegation. Much the same might be said for other areas where we see 
virtually no delegation to agencies—gun control policy, for instance. 
By comparison, voters have tremendous distrust of the legislature when 
it comes to financial regulation.175 And for good reason. It is not easy to 
determine whether financial policy A or financial policy B is better for us—
this is true even for relatively attentive citizens. Moreover, the immense 
resources of the financial sector suggest the ability to ply legislators. Voters, 
thus, do not know if policy A or policy B is in their best interest, but they 
have a natural and justified suspicion of the legislative process. Fearing for 
their jobs, legislators come to see delegation as a convenient path forward. 
They set the objective legislatively, and the agency then matches facts to 
objectives,176 constrained by administrative procedures and judicial review.177 
Notice that although the problem that delegation solves is not necessarily 
one of expertise, this is not to say that expertise is irrelevant to policymaking, 
even where Congress does not delegate. Indeed, the classic example of non-
delegation, fiscal policy, undoubtedly involves the application of expertise. 
The difference is that Congress can solve the expertise problem internally 
with respect to fiscal policy—because of voters’ ability to evaluate the policy’s 
implications for their own welfare—whereas it cannot for many other areas 
of policy, such as financial regulation. This explains why Congress has, in fact, 
invested heavily in developing native expertise for fiscal policy. It is one of 
the few areas, indeed, where Congress has created precisely the type of 
advisory agency that Ely and followers have urged upon the institution. In 
1974, Congress created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which 
 
with author) (finding, against strands of earlier literature, that pocketbook conditions are equally 
important to behavior as sociotropic conditions). 
175 For instance, only twenty-three percent of Americans say they trust Wall Street to do what 
is best for the economy. CNN ORC POLL (Oct. 24, 2011), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/
cnn/2011/images/10/24/rel17e.pdf [https:perma.cc/S9CF-A7KA]. 
176 See Stack, supra note 82, at 895 (describing the obligation of the agency as a mandate to 
“conform its conduct in accordance with the purposes Congress has established”). 
177 Naturally, this is not to say that financial interests are not active in the rulemaking process. 
For accounts of such influence, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-
Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 79 (2013) (analyzing the involvement of various 
groups in the development of the Volcker Rule and noting that “there were 351 financial institution 
meetings with federal regulators . . . [amounting to] 78% of all such meetings”), and Thomas O. 
McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1671, 1687 (2012) (describing combat over the implementation of the Durbin amendment and the 
overwhelming activity of the banking industry and its lobbying groups in the rulemaking debate). 
Rather, the point is that agencies’ capacity to capitulate to these pressures—pressures equally, if not 
more present in the legislative context—is constrained. Though the administrative process offers 
advantages over the legislative process, see Part IV for a discussion of possible slippage in the former. 
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“produce[s] independent analyses of budgetary and economic issues to 
support the congressional budget process.”178 
Much the same story exists at the level of congressional committee. 
Consider, for instance, the resources of various U.S. House committees. The 
Committee on Appropriations, which bears primary responsibility for setting 
spending levels for federal programs, spent approximately $21 million on 
salaries in 2015.179 The House Budget Committee, which establishes the 
resolution setting the overall funding level that the Appropriations 
Committee works with, had salaries of about $4.1 million in that same year.180 
Meanwhile, the House Ways and Means Committee, which is responsible for 
tax policy,181 spent roughly $7.6 million on salaries.182 Thus, even ignoring the 
Joint Committee on Taxation and the CBO,183 not to mention the U.S. Senate 
committee structure, the House spends over $32 million per year on salaries 
for those working on fiscal policy. By comparison, the House spends relatively 
little developing expertise on financial regulation. In 2015, the House spent 
about $6.4 million on salaries for the House Financial Services Committee, 
the principal committee with jurisdiction in that area.184 
The problem that delegation solves, therefore, is not expertise as such, 
but instead distrust. Where voters can evaluate policy and expertise is 
required, Congress invests in native expertise. This explains why Congress 
has built out fiscal committees and created highly respected and 
professionalized advisory agencies, the CBO and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. But where distrust prevails, as prominently is the case for financial 
regulation, Congress delegates to administrative agencies and constrains their 
decisionmaking with administrative procedures and judicial review. 
 
178 Introduction to CBO, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/overview 
[https://perma.cc/6AJ9-9BDP]. 
179 House Appropriations Committee Staff Salaries, LEGISTORM, https://www.legistorm.com/
office/House_Appropriations_Committee/1533.html [https://perma.cc/UYK8-UP62]. 
180 House Budget Committee Staff Salaries, LEGISTORM, https://www.legistorm.com/
office/House_Budget_Committee/1534.html [https://perma.cc/E6G8-DJZP]. 
181 About, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/FV5S-2T67] (observing that the committee is the “chief tax-writing committee in 
the House of Representatives”). 
182 House Ways and Means Committee Staff Salaries, LEGISTORM, https://www.legistorm.com/
office/House_Ways_and_Means_Committee/1438.html [https://perma.cc/BK8Z-ALAY]. 
183 For a history of the Joint Committee on Taxation, see George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew 
Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 787, 849 (2013) (quoting one member of Congress involved 
with its creation as saying the committee “should be composed of experts, and . . . ought to be made 
up in such fashion that it can not [sic] be said that it is a whitewashing committee or anything of 
that sort; not to be subject to any such criticism as that”). 
184 House Financial Services Committee Staff Salaries, LEGISTORM, https://www.legistorm.com/
office/House_Financial_Services_Committee/1200.html [https://perma.cc/XWN5-Z2TG]. 
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IV. EROSION AND ANXIETY? 
That is the theory. What then of the growing anxiety over the 
administrative state? If procedurally constrained administrative lawmaking 
largely addresses the problem of trust, why might observers no longer trust 
administrative lawmaking? 
The answer to this question undoubtedly has several parts. The simplest 
response is likely at least partially correct: as the government, and hence the 
administrative state, has done more, there has been more to disagree with. 
This disagreement manifests in various forms of anxiety. But other sources 
also likely exist. For instance, trust in the Judiciary is at a low,185 possibly due 
to the polarization and perceived politicization of that organ of 
government.186 To the extent courts behave in an overtly political way, they 
may undermine the credibility of administrative transparency and 
trustworthiness. With a polarized Judiciary, the information value of judicial 
decisions is threatened: if a court upholds an agency action against a 
procedural challenge, the public may view the decision as following from 
political alignment; conversely, if a court sets aside an action, that may be due 
to procedural defect, or to political malalignment. This development 
potentially threatens the credibility of administrative procedures. 
Even as such factors may also play a role, here I wish to pursue another 
explanation of the prevailing anxiety that centers on procedural erosion. A 
core tenet of this theory is that legislative delegation combined with 
administrative law ameliorates problems of distrust through procedural 
constraints that encourage transparency, fairness, and deliberation, and 
thereby credibly discourage the most egregious forms of abusive lawmaking. 
Yet even if this theory aptly describes much of the history of the 
administrative state, it is reasonable to question whether it describes the 
administrative state as it currently exists. As Professors Farber and O’Connell 
have recently and effectively argued,187 there has indeed been much erosion 
in administrative procedures in recent decades.188 This theory suggests that 
such erosion may contribute meaningfully to the current anxiety over 
government and the administrative state in particular. 
 
185 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%, GALLUP (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judicial-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/9UYB-C638]. 
186 See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 63-64 (2002) 
(describing ways in which “‘judicialization’ of politics tends to produce the politicization of courts”). 
187 See Farber & O’Connell, infra note 195, at 1140 (arguing that “the actual workings of the 
administrative state have increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic 
judicial decisions that followed”). 
188 For an argument that the APA is wholesale off-square and maladapted to the administrative 
state, and has been so since its inception, see Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative 
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96 (2003). 
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A. Procedural Erosion and Distrust 
Without belaboring points ably made by other scholars—notably 
Professor Rubin and, most aligned, Professors Farber and O’Connell189—the 
ambition of this Section is to focus on the broader historical contours of 
procedural erosion, with ties to the trust-based theory of delegation. 
The fount of procedural erosion was the rise of informal rulemaking 
starting in the 1960s.190 For most of the early history of the administrative 
state, agency activity was overwhelmingly adjudicatory activity, with little 
rulemaking.191 This changed in a dramatic and well-documented fashion in 
the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1974, the annual number of informal 
rulemakings increased from roughly 500 to over 2,000.192 Reflecting this fact, 
the D.C. Circuit heard very few cases involving informal rulemaking in the 
first decades following the passage of the APA. In the first two decades of the 
APA, for instance, the court heard a total of thirteen cases that cited the 
rulemaking provisions of the APA.193 Over the next twenty years, however, 
between 1967 and 1987, the number of such cases increased to 291, an over 
twenty-fold increase in volume.194 Similarly revealing, early administrative 
law casebooks contained virtually no discussion of informal rulemaking,195 
now perhaps the dominant topic in casebooks. 
This shift to rulemaking had far-reaching consequences for our 
administrative system that we continue to struggle with today. The most 
obvious, and in many ways root, problem with the shift is that, though the 
APA contained provisions for informal rulemaking,196 they were extremely 
 
189 See supra notes 186-87. 
190 I reserve the question of why informal rulemaking increased in the 1960s for another effort. 
For other accounts, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
TULSA L. J. 185, 188-91 (1996), positing that scholarly arguments regarding the comparative 
advantages of rulemaking and broader statutory mandates for agencies led to the increase of 
rulemaking. See also Schiller, infra note 191, at 1148-49 (arguing that increased workloads and 
obligations to regulate broader areas of activity drove the increase in rulemaking). 
191 See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145-47 (2011) (describing how adjudication was the 
dominant mode of agency action before and, initially, after the New Deal). 
192 See id. at 1147 (discussing the monthly rate of informal rulemaking between 1960 and 1974); 
see also Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 162-65 (2000) (documenting the shift to rulemaking and identifying 
congressional action and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Florida East Coast Railway Co. as the 
driving factors behind the shift). 
193 This figure comes from a search of Google Scholar, using the string “5 U.S.C. § 553” for 
the years 1946–1967. 
194 This figure comes from the same methodology, but applying to the years 1967–1987. 
195 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2014) (noting, for example, that Kenneth Culp Davis’ 1951 casebook 
contained “only three pages” on informal rulemaking). 
196 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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sparse relative to those for formal adjudications.197 According to the text of 
the APA, an agency must take only a few steps to issue an informal rule: 
provide notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register;198 accept public 
comments on the proposed rule;199 and “[a]fter consideration of the relevant 
matter presented,” include with the final rule a “concise general statement” of 
basis and purpose.200 This means that the center of the administrative mass—
a rapidly increasing mass—was moving to a policymaking form that had 
sharply limited hardwired procedural regularity. The procedures that had 
assured fairness, transparency, and deliberation prior to the 1960s became 
increasingly irrelevant. 
The consequences of this shift have, I submit, largely unfolded in two 
phases. The first phase consisted of various external actors in administrative 
law attempting to “fix” the new administrative form, either to cope with, or 
to preserve the viability and legitimacy of the form by saving it from its 
obvious procedural inadequacies. All three branches of government 
contributed in this effort. 
The courts tend to receive the most attention; in any event, they perhaps 
moved the most quickly. The lean statutory instructions in section 553 of the 
APA contain incredible ambiguity. For adequate notice, what exactly must 
the notice contain? How detailed does the proposed rule have to be? Does the 
agency have to report in the proposal any studies that it relied on in 
formulating it?201 What if the agency changes its mind after issuing the 
proposed rule, how much can the final rule differ from the proposed rule? 
Can the agency have ex parte contacts during the rulemaking process? Does 
the agency have to respond to all of the comments, or just give them 
“consideration”? How detailed must the agency’s response to comments be? 
To a large extent, the story of modern administrative case law is one of judicial 
efforts to address these and similar questions, reflected in the figures above 
on the D.C. Circuit’s caseload. The trend of judicial decisions was to inject 
adjudicatory elements into the informal rulemaking process—to make 
informal rulemakings somewhat more like formal adjudications.202 Much of 
 
197 §§ 556–57. 
198 § 553(b). 
199 § 553(c). 
200 Id. 
201 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding 
that the EPA was required to disclose the bases on which it promulgated its regulation). 
202 E.g., Farber & O’Connell, supra note 195, at 1144 (noting that “[w]hen courts started to pay 
more attention to informal rulemaking, they tended to respond by pushing it in the direction of 
adjudication through creation of a ‘paper hearing’ requirement”). 
676 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 633 
this judicial work occurred in the D.C. Circuit, and largely during the 
1970s.203 
Around the same time, the executive branch was developing its own 
responses to the rise of this new procedural form. Starting with President 
Johnson,204 and maturing with President Reagan, the executive response was 
to centralize control over agencies and the rulemaking process. For these 
purposes, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the 
most significant institution.205 The President uses this office to screen agency 
rulemaking efforts: at least for the most important rules—before an agency 
publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as required by the APA—the 
agency must first notify OIRA of the proposed rule.206 OIRA may then 
approve the rule, reject it, or ask for changes.207 This centralized review 
process had, as I suggest, largely matured by the early 1980s, with every 
President since continuing and refining it. 
Congress, too, adapted to the new regulatory landscape, though as noted 
below ultimately in less effective and sometimes counterproductive ways. 
One congressional move was to graft additional procedures onto the APA. 
For example, Congress attempted to shed some light on administrative 
agencies by passing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966,208 and 
the Government in the Sunshine Act (GSA) in 1976.209 Another major 
congressional response was to increase the oversight capacity and tools of the 
legislature, by reorganizing committees and endowing them with additional 
resources.210 During this same period, Congress likewise used the legislative 
 
203 See, e.g., Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the Hard 
Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L. J. 2599, 2599 (2002) (arguing that extensive procedural 
requirements imposed on agencies during this period “were a product of the individual visions of 
judges” predominantly on the D.C. Circuit). 
204 See, e.g., Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory 
Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2011) (noting that “the Johnson 
Administration developed the blueprint for centralized regulatory review”). 
205 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (2006) 
(observing that shortly after his inauguration, President Reagan “promulgated Executive Order 
12,291 and asserted an unprecedented level of control over the administrative apparatus” (footnote 
omitted)). 
206 See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1767-
70 (2013) (describing the OIRA review process as called for by the relevant executive orders). 
207 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 
70 CHI. L. REV. 821, 846-49 (2003) (documenting the number of agency rules reviewed and the 
percentage of rules changed by OIRA between 1981 and 2000). 
208 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
209 § 552b. 
210 See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 367-
414 (1981) (describing how congressional leaders reorganized power structures and increased 
institutional resources during the 1970s). 
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veto more commonly,211 a powerful tool of legislative control. In response to 
the shift to rulemaking and increase in its volume, Congress attempted to 
revise administrative procedures, in a fashion as with the courts, and also to 
enhance control over agencies, in a fashion as with the executive. 
All three branches, therefore, adapted to the massive shift to an otherwise 
essentially unconstrained and unproceduralized form of agency activity. The 
courts attempted to reproceduralize rulemaking, to make it into a form of 
activity more like the adjudications that they understood; the executive 
attempted to gain more control over agency discretion; and the Congress 
adopted something of a mix between the two approaches. 
In the relevant sense, however, all of these external adaptations 
substantially failed. Part of the reason for the failure is that many of them 
were not, in fact, designed to be responsive to the problems opened by 
procedural erosion. Perhaps the most successful adaptation—successful, that 
is, on its own terms—was centralized review through OIRA. By most 
accounts, the executive exerts enormous influence over executive agencies 
through centralized review.212 However, even as this form of control 
responded to the President’s objectives, it did nothing to restore trust in 
administrative lawmaking. Indeed many observers believe that centralized 
review deepens problems of distrust. The public cannot easily determine what 
changes in rules OIRA required; it is likewise unclear why OIRA asks for 
changes in some contexts and not others; or who officers of the agency meet 
with and what is said in the meetings.213 In this way, OIRA injected a 
shadowy and powerful force into the administrative state. Congressional 
efforts to enhance control over the administrative state might be similarly 
characterized—recall that legislative control itself is a root of distrust—
though they generally were both less effective and less secretive.214 For 
example, the institution lost perhaps its most potent tool of control, the 
legislative veto, due to an adverse Supreme Court ruling.215 
 
211 Id. at 350 (noting that, “After 1973, the [legislative veto] was proposed almost routinely whenever 
the Congress found itself forced to delegate some new, broad authority to the executive branch”). 
212 See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 140 (2011) (summarizing 
the academic literature on OIRA as “giv[ing] the agency credit for a great deal of power”). 
213 See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED 
DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
WORKER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2011) (explaining that OIRA “operates as a free-
ranging squad that pulls an astounding number of draft regulatory actions . . . into a dragnet that 
operates behind closed doors”). 
214 See William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three 
Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 172, 183-97 (2009) (discussing “failed” 
congressional efforts to increase transparency in the rulemaking process). 
215 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
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The other part of the reason that these external efforts failed is that 
agencies themselves learned and adapted to these novel external procedural 
impositions. These agency adaptations represent the second phase of 
procedural erosion, a phase that partially overlaps with the first and has been 
underway in earnest for roughly three decades, seemingly gathering force all 
along the way. The agency adaptations consist essentially of a variety of 
efforts to evade the burdens of procedural regularity. It is not easy to 
comprehensively catalogue the methods of evasion; a great multiplicity of 
approaches exists. It is less easy still to systematically quantify the extent of 
evasion, in no small way because many of the methods of evasion operate, in 
part, precisely by virtue of skirting publication requirements. Nevertheless, a 
sizable strand of literature on administrative law consists of studying the 
various ways in which agencies engage in this evasive behavior.216 
For example, the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions contain a “good 
cause” exemption,217 allowing agencies to opt out of notice and comment in 
many circumstances. All of the evidence suggests that agencies have used this 
provision extensively. A prominent Government Accountability Office study, 
for example, found that agencies failed to provide for notice and comment in 
roughly thirty-five percent of “major” rules,218 and forty-four percent of non-
major rules issued between 2003 and 2010.219 The solid majority of these 
procedural shortcuts were associated with the good cause exemption.220 
According to another recent study by Professor Raso, which uses different 
data, agencies exempted roughly half of all rules from notice and comment.221 
This same study indicates that courts do not police the good cause exemption 
evenly or assiduously.222 Thus, even when agencies stay within the terms of 
the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions, they have of late heavily weighted 
the exemptions. Judging by these studies, indeed, the exemption has nearly 
engulfed ordinary notice and comment rulemaking. 
 
216 See, e.g., supra note 92. Another evasive pattern involves privatization of government 
activity. For an excellent account of this trend, and the problems it entails, see Michaels, supra note 
122, at 571 (“Agency leaders are employing various privatization practices that have the effect of co-
opting select public participants and defanging civil servants.”). 
217 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012) (exempting the agency from notice and comment procedures 
“when the agency for good cause finds [and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons 
therefor in the rules issued] that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to the public interest”). 
218 “Major” is a statutorily defined term, referring to rules that, among other things, are likely 
to have an effect of $100 million or more annually on the economy. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)(A) (2012). 
219 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL 
STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 36 (2012). 
220 See id. at 15. 
221 See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 69 (2015). 
222 See id. at 68. 
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In like vein, agencies have opted to regulate through “guidances” rather 
than through “legislative rules” in many cases.223 Procedurally, these 
guidances, too, do not need to run through notice and comment under the 
APA.224 Moreover, unlike rules subject to the good cause exemption, 
guidances also often cannot be directly challenged and reviewed in court due 
to the jurisdictional limitations of standing and finality.225 The line between 
“legislative rules” and “interpretative rules,” or guidances generally, is not 
well defined, and has long confounded courts and scholars.226 In principle, 
the distinction between the two sets of rules is that legislative rules create 
new legal obligations, whereas interpretive rules and guidances “merely” 
interpret and clarify existing obligations. Yet it is often not clear when a rule 
develops new obligations and when it instead clarifies an existing source of 
obligations. The attraction of guidances to the agency is obvious: they can 
control primary behavior often nearly as well as an ordinary legislative rule, 
yet they can be issued without notice and comment, and indeed, perhaps 
without direct subsequent judicial review. Many observers conclude that 
agencies have increasingly relied on guidance documents to regulate,227 and 
 
223 “Guidance” refers generally to non-legislative rules that agencies issue. The APA does not 
refer to “guidances,” but does include “interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy,” for 
which the term guidances represents a sort of generic stand-in. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
224 See id. 
225 See Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern Administrative Procedure: The Case 
for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 82-90 (2016) (explaining that courts are reluctant to 
intervene when agencies issue guidance because they view the guidance as an intermediate measure); 
see also James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of 
Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 127 (1994) (demonstrating how the EPA substituted guidance documents 
for informal rulemakings); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack 
of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1727, 1748 (2007) (showing widespread evasion of rulemaking procedures in the context of the 
Department of the Treasury); Rakoff, supra note 192, at 165-66 (“[T]here is a trend toward setting 
regulatory policy in less formal ways.”). 
226 For an excellent account of these troubles, as well as a proposed solution to them, see 
generally Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007). 
227 Historically, there has been no general requirement to publish guidances, much less to do 
so in the Federal Register, or any other centralized outlet. And though, as of late, some important 
guidances must now be placed on agencies’ websites, there remains no requirement to publish them 
in a centralized outlet. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (revoked by 
Executive Order 13,497, Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Regulatory Planning 
and Review (Jan. 30, 2009)); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 
(Jan. 24, 2007). One consequence of the fact that agencies have generally not archived guidance 
documents in any reliable way is that it is challenging to track how this form of agency activity has 
changed over time. 
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moreover that they have done so in response to the procedural burdens 
associated with informal rulemaking.228 
The rise of informal rulemaking, therefore, heralded the deproceduralization 
of administrative lawmaking in substantial measure. Courts and political 
overseers attempted to patch the procedures—to graft legitimating aspects of 
adjudication on to the skeletal form of the informal rulemaking. But in large part 
these efforts either failed or, where successful, drove agencies to adopt even less 
proceduralized forms of administrative action. 
B. Tentative Empirical Assessment 
This sequence of developments may shed some light on the prevailing 
anxiety over our public institutions. We have no direct data on trust in the 
administrative state, but at least judging by scholarly attention, the 
administrative state is in something of a legitimacy crisis.229 The question 
therefore presses—does administrative anxiety follow deproceduralization? It 
is not feasible to test this hypothesis in any rigorous way—even aside from 
data limitations, if only because we have but a single federal government to 
consider. Yet suggestively consider the following metrics and patterns. 
To measure scholarly anxiety more systematically, I determine the 
number of scholarly articles that touch on the “legitimacy” of administrative 
agencies. I then normalize these figures by the number of articles touching 
on administrative law.230 This analysis is itself of interest, and reveals a 
striking pattern of increase in concern over the legitimacy of the 
administrative state starting around 1970: between 1940 and 1960, the 
normalized count was about 0.1. By 1970, it had doubled to 0.2, and by 2010 
it had tripled from its 1940s origin to roughly 0.3. One shorthand way to think 
about these figures is that approximately thirty percent of administrative law 
articles currently concern the legitimacy of the administrative state—up from 
about ten percent in 1940. 
This measure of scholarly distrust closely mirrors a plausible indicator of 
public distrust based on New York Times stories. I calculate the number of 
Times stories about federal agencies that relate to unfairness, capture, or 
corruption. I then again normalize the counts, but now by the number of 
 
228 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 225, at 61 (observing that the “tough standards that the courts 
have imposed on notice and comment proceedings have induced administrative agencies to take . . . 
evasive steps,” prominently including a transition to guidance documents). 
229 See supra note 8 (referencing numerous works that have questioned whether the 
administrative state is constitutional). 
230 To recover the numerator, I search Google Scholar using the following string: 
administrative agency legitimacy. To recover the denominator, I search Google Scholar using the 
following string: administrative law. I limit the searches to specific years to produce a series of the 
intensity of scholarly interest in the legitimacy of the administrative state. 
2018] Delegating for Trust 681 
stories regarding administrative agencies.231 I do this in bins of decades, from 
1940 to 2010. This metric provides a plausible indicator of what informed 
citizens thought of the administrative state over time. The two series correlate 
strongly—indeed, the correlation between these two metrics is almost unity, 
0.95, and is statistically significant at any conventional level.232 This high 
correlation suggests that the metric of scholarly distrust captures an element 
of wider public distrust and disquiet, at least among informed people, rather 
than merely the idiosyncratic hand-wringing of obsessive academics. 
Continuing then with this measure of scholarly distrust, what is even 
more notable is that it correlates highly with a plausible measure of 
deproceduralization. There, again, is no ready-made measure of the extent to 
which agency actions follow rigorous and transparent procedures. But 
following the narrative above, consider the number of pages in the Federal 
Register.233 Agencies must publish rules in the Federal Register for them to 
have legal effect, meaning that almost all rules appear in that publication.234 
For this reason, scholars often use the number of pages as a proxy for the 
number of rules that agencies produce in a given period.235 Also critical for 
present purposes, agencies need not, and generally do not, publish 
adjudicatory orders in the Federal Register. This means that the number of 
pages in the Federal Register in a year provides a rough approximation of 
rulemaking but not adjudicatory activity, a useful feature of the series given 
that informal rulemaking is associated with the deproceduralization of the 
administrative state. As shown in Figure 1, the correlation between the extent 
of informal rulemaking and distrust is positive and strong, at 0.94.236 
Plainly, we cannot rule out the possibility that this relationship is 
spurious—some third force may be causing both series to move together. As 
noted above, for instance, distrust may accompany the growth of government, 
apart from or in addition to deproceduralization. Using observational data, it 
is likely impossible to sort out such questions credibly, and this remains a 
 
231 To recover the numerator, I search the Proquest New York Times archive using the following 
string: federal and (commission or bureau or department or agency) and (corrupt! or capture! or 
unfair or illegitimate or “special interests”). To recover the denominator, I search the same for: 
federal and (commission or bureau or department or agency). I calculate this normalized count for 
each decade starting in 1940. 
232 The relevant p-value is 0.0003. 
233 The Federal Register maintains a database of historical statistics. See Federal Register 
Statistics, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids/understanding-the-
federal-register/federal-register-statistics [https://perma.cc/RK3M-PB2T]. 
234 A caveat to this statement concerns guidances, discussed above. See supra notes 222-27 and 
accompanying text. 
235 See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations and Regulatory Review, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 166 (2009) (noting that a scholar used the count of Federal Register pages as 
“a proxy for regulatory activity”). 
236 This, too, is statistically significant at any conventional level (p = 0.0004). 
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suggestive exercise.237 Still, the pattern is striking: during the first three 
decades after the APA, the density of articles contending with the legitimacy 
of the administrative state hovered around 0.1. Precisely as agencies started 
to adopt informal rules in the 1960s, essentially unscripted by the APA, 
distrust in agencies accelerated, as reflected in scholarly works and in public 
accounts. 
FIGURE 1. PROCEDURAL EROSION AND DISTRUST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 That said, it seems unlikely that distrust increased in response to an increase in adjudicatory 
policymaking. This follows from the fact that, even as rulemaking ascended, adjudicatory 
policymaking appears not to have increased in similarly dramatic fashion. Though statutory 
definitions change over time, making intertemporal comparisons difficult, consider that in 1958, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board collectively employed some seventy-four 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) to make initial or recommended decisions in adjudications. 1958 
OFFICE OF ADMIN. PROC., ANN. REP. 110-11. By 1980, these same agencies employed 132 ALJs. 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976–1978 21 (1980). By 2017, they apparently 
employed forty-one ALJs. Administrative Law Judges, OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency 
[https://perma.cc/5DKZ-XDU8]. By comparison, the number of pages in the Federal Register—a 
measure of informal rulemaking—increased six-fold between 1960 and 1980. 
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V. LESSONS: PROCEDURAL REFORM AND VESTIGIAL DOCTRINES 
This trust-based conception carries lessons for a number of enduring 
debates in administrative law. Here, I consider two areas of current debate. 
First, I consider regulatory reform, and in particular the reform of 
administrative procedures. Second, I consider the status of the non-
delegation doctrine and of deference regimes. 
A. Trust-Building Procedures 
The traditional battle in administrative procedures pits a concern over 
“efficiency” against a concern over “rule of law.”238 More stringent procedures 
generally ensure a fairer, more transparent administrative process that 
promotes rule of law values, but they also often slow down administrative 
decisionmaking and make it more difficult to effectuate statutory objectives. 
The trust-based theory of this Article suggests a different framing on this 
old debate. It locates a foundational rationale for administrative 
decisionmaking precisely in the credible fairness and transparency that 
administrative procedures afford. In this light, excessive laxity in procedures 
promises, not an increase in efficiency, but instead a collapse in the legitimacy 
and political value of administrative lawmaking. Robbed of its political value, 
the response to this collapse may be to reign in, unreasonably constrain, or 
otherwise diminish the ability of the administrative state to solve pressing 
public problems. One view of the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017,239 
recently passed by the House, is that it is one such over-correction. 
But if this account is correct, some sort of correction may be in order. 
Rather than undertake a comprehensive assessment of how procedural 
erosion might be arrested, here I simply want to suggest an orientation 
toward ensuring fairness and transparency in administrative procedures, with 
the goal of ends-means rationality in policymaking. The theory offers 
guidance on at least three issues of current debate. 
1. Procedural Formality and Transparency 
Some reforms would, it seems, be relatively painless. For instance, it 
would cost little to standardize and publish agency guidances in a centralized 
outlet, such as the Federal Register or a companion volume. It would likewise 
 
238 This is a recurrent theme in debates over procedural reform. For a discussion of the APA’s 
passage and the debate that went into that legislation, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: 
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996) 
(arguing that the “the APA helped to resolve the conflict between bureaucratic efficiency and the 
rule of law”). 
239 H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (as passed by the House, Jan. 12, 2017). 
684 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 633 
cost little to require agencies to give notice of impending guidances, beyond 
what is currently required through presidential directive.240 More costly, but 
also perhaps more beneficial, agencies might be encouraged to take greater 
advantage of declaratory orders, as Professor Bremmer has urged.241 The APA 
envisions agencies issuing declaratory orders,242 but agencies rarely do so, as 
they prefer the more informal practice of issuing guidances. Other procedural 
reforms worth considering include requiring agencies to run through 
ordinary notice and comment, at least for major rules. This would eliminate 
the most troubling aspects of notice-less rules and the over-use of the good 
cause exemption. 
Following their assessment of the growing “mismatch” between the 
assumptions and realities of administrative law, Professors Farber and 
O’Connell likewise offer a series of possible executive or legislative reforms 
worth considering: for example, statutory provisions that mitigate OIRA 
influence243 and greater OIRA transparency.244 Such reforms seem to hold 
merit, as they generally recognize and grapple with the problems of non-
technocratic control over agencies. 
2. Cost–Benefit Analysis 
Many have called for agencies to engage in greater cost–benefit analysis, 
wherein agencies estimate the costs (e.g., the compliance costs) and benefits 
(e.g., reductions in illness from pollution) of a proposed regulation before 
issuing it.245 With good estimates of these quantities, an agency can 
determine whether a regulation will enhance social welfare, the dominant 
justification for engaging in this form of analysis. The current debate over 
cost–benefit analysis largely concerns, first, whether agencies can 
 
240 See supra note 227 (requiring agencies to list guidances on their respective websites). 
241 For an excellent account of declaratory orders, and a call for their greater use, see Emily S. 
Bremer, The Agency Declaratory Judgment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (advocating for 
increased use of declaratory orders). 
242 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012) (“The agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound 
discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.”). 
243 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 195, at 1181-83. 
244 Id. at 1184 (advocating for formalization of the OIRA process to quicken turnaround and 
manage expectations). 
245 E.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 5-6 (2006) (arguing in favor of cost–benefit analysis when it measures the overall wellbeing of 
the public rather than focusing on the Pareto principle); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST BENEFIT STATE: 
THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 137 (2002) (arguing cost–benefit analysis helps agencies 
understand consequences, identify tools, and save both lives and money). 
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competently estimate the quantities of interest,246 and, second, what role 
courts should play in reviewing cost–benefit analysis.247 
The trust-based theory of this Article posits another rationale for 
engaging in cost–benefit analysis.248 In forcing agencies to make their 
assumptions explicit, it compels a form of transparency that may be 
important to building trust in administrative decisionmaking. If done 
competently, cost–benefit analysis similarly acts as a constraint on 
administrative decisionmaking—one of course entirely absent from the 
legislative arena—that prevents agencies from abusing their lawmaking 
authorities. With this analysis, it would be more challenging, for instance, to 
issue a rule that granted favors to special interests at the greater expense of 
society broadly. 
Of course, this presumes that cost–benefit analysis is done competently. 
There may well be policy domains where agencies cannot competently 
estimate the costs or, more likely, benefits of a proposed regulation. Human 
dignity, classically, may be something that we value greatly, but we cannot 
easily quantify, leading cost–benefit analysis astray.249 Likewise, some policy 
questions may be so complex or large-scale that it is impossible to 
competently forecast the costs or benefits of a proposed regulation.250 But if 
it can be done well, cost–benefit analysis would seem to have many benefits 
for developing public trust in administrative lawmaking, a proposition I find 
empirical support for in an initial experiment.251 
The theory, likewise, suggests that courts play an important role in 
making cost–benefit analysis credible. After Business Roundtable v. SEC,252 
wherein the court faulted the SEC for not adequately quantifying costs 
associated with its proxy access rule and vacated it on that basis under 
arbitrariness review, a debate arose over how courts should interface with 
agencies’ cost–benefit analyses. Some took the view that, at least for financial 
regulation, courts should tread lightly when reviewing cost–benefit 
 
246 E.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 8 (2004) (arguing that cost–
benefit analysis often leads to incorrect assessments because “human life, health, and nature cannot 
be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless”). 
247 See infra note 253 and text accompanying note 252. 
248 I examine this view empirically elsewhere. See Stiglitz, supra note 132. 
249 See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 246. 
250 E.g., A.R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 685 (1965) 
(noting that cost–benefit analyses “are least relevant and serviceable for what one might call large-
size investment decisions,” which plausibly “alter the constellation of relative outputs and prices over 
the whole economy,” and that in such cases “nothing less than some sort of general equilibrium 
approach would suffice”); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost–Benefit Analysis in Its Place: 
Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011). 
251 Stiglitz, supra note 132. 
252 647 F.3d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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analyses.253 Others were more open to the idea of courts questioning how or 
whether an agency engaged in cost–benefit analysis.254 Without endorsing the 
aggressive calls for quantification in Business Roundtable, this analysis points 
to the benefits of having courts question cost–benefit analyses, and of 
compelling agencies to explain their analyses.255 Here, as in many areas, 
agency freedom—in the form of trust and delegated authority—may arrive 
paradoxically through constraint. 
3. Arbitrariness Review 
This last point feeds into a broader question of how courts should review 
agency actions for arbitrariness, that is, the APA’s command that courts set 
aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”256 Judges and the wider academic 
community debated what this provision meant for much of the 1970s, largely 
in response to the rise of informal rulemaking and the meager structure that 
the APA gives to that form of policymaking.257 The essential contours of the 
debate involved Judge Bazelon arguing for greater procedural rigor, under the 
view that generalist judges have a poor read of the complex substance of 
agency regulations, but that procedural integrity forces a degree of rationality 
and reliability, exposes flaws in agency reasoning, and can be competently 
 
253 See generally John C. Coates IV, Cost–Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2015) (examining cost–benefit analysis through a series of case 
studies and concluding, in part, that the results “call into question simplistic efforts to mandate 
CBA—particularly quantified CBA, and particularly when enforced through judicial review by 
generalist courts . . .”). See also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 170-83 (2016) (adopting 
a more globally negative view of judicial review of agencies’ cost–benefit analyses). 
254 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost–Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2017) (“[W]here a reasonable objection is made to a regulation, suggesting that it would do more 
harm than good, courts legitimately demand some kind of justification. In some cases, that justification 
requires numbers.”); Richard L. Revesz, Cost–Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State, 34 
YALE J. REG. 545, 594-98 (2017) (defending judicial review of agency cost–benefit analysis under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard); see also Stiglitz, supra note 132 (reviewing the literature and studying 
the relationship between trust, judicial review, and cost–benefit analysis). 
255 I find support for this view in an initial experiment. See Stiglitz, supra note 132. 
256 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2012). Although we now connect arbitrariness review with this APA 
provision, early cases often did so less clearly. For instance, many of the early “hard look” review 
cases in the D.C. Circuit did not even cite that statutory provision. See, e.g., Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (1970); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (1969); 
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (1969). 
257 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “History Belongs to the Winners”: The Bazelon–Leventhal 
Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999-1006 (2006) (supplying an excellent review of the debate, and 
pointing to its current importance). 
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enforced by courts.258 Judge Leventhal, by contrast, called on judges to 
grapple with the substance of the agency decision, a task that “requires 
enough steeping in technical matters to determine whether the agency has 
exercised a reasoned discretion.”259 Though by common understanding 
Vermont Yankee laid to rest the more aggressive forms of Judge Bazelon’s 
procedure-encouraging review,260 the questions of what substantive review 
means, and of what substantive review might indirectly imply for agency 
procedure, remain contested.261 On this point, the theory of this Article 
suggests that substantive review, as well as interpretation of the native APA 
procedures,262 ought to be used to excite agencies to adopt processes that 
promote transparency, deliberation, and reasoned agency decisionmaking, 
even if at the cost of speed and efficiency.263 
B. Vestigial Doctrines and the Democratic Price 
The non-delegation doctrine and the idea of de novo review of questions 
of law appear at first to be vestigial doctrines: intellectual attachments formed 
for a much earlier time, enduring for idiosyncratic reasons, yet wholly 
unsuited to the present and perhaps even dangerous under current 
 
258 For a nice example of this position, see International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 
615, 650-53 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (arguing for more process, and against judicial review of 
substance, noting that, “Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does not 
know. I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not know enough about 
dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or not 
the government’s approach to these matters was statistically valid.”). See also Krotoszynski, supra 
note 257, at 999-1002 (discussing Judge Bazelon’s “Judicial Incompetence” argument). 
259 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 257, at 1002-04. 
260 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 520, 524 (1978) 
(holding that “reviewing courts are generally not free to impose” procedural rights on agencies). 
261 For a seminal piece in this line, see generally Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal 
Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981) (discussing the questions left 
unanswered by Vermont Yankee regarding the proper scope of judicial review of rulemaking and 
calling for a second decision clarifying these issues). For a more recent evolution of this debate, see 
generally Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
856 (2007) (examining previous calls for Vermont Yankee II and explaining why certain regulations of 
rulemakings and applications of requirements violate the holding of Vermont Yankee), and Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 902 (2007) (responding to claims that versions of Vermont Yankee II do not “follow 
logically” from Vermont Yankee and to “arguments that the court should issue opinions in Vermont 
Yankee III, IV, and V”). 
262 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249-53 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(elaborating procedural requirements on the basis of the APA’s sparse informal rulemaking provisions). 
263 One might achieve much the same result, too, by denying deference to agency actions 
involving statutory interpretation that fall short in these respects. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (denying Chevron deference to agency “procedurally defective” 
action that failed to provide “reasoned explanation” for policy change). 
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conditions. That may be the case, but we should also credit the idea that these 
doctrinal positions reflect a commitment to democratic ideals. The non-
delegation doctrine is commonly viewed as a way to encourage Congress to 
make decisions itself.264 Part of the impetus for pursuing de novo review may 
similarly be to encourage Congress to resolve ambiguities in chamber.265 
One overarching lesson to draw from the theory of this Article is that 
particularistic legislative lawmaking is highly problematic due to information 
problems, and therefore that “democracy-forcing” doctrines may be 
misdirected. The choice to delegate, indeed, is itself a democratic choice,266 
one that does well by the public under appropriate procedural constraints on 
agencies. This observation has plain implications for the idea that we should 
have a more robust non-delegation doctrine. That idea works in precisely the 
wrong direction by channeling decisionmaking into a body that is poorly 
suited to resolving particularistic policy questions in the public interest. 
Moreover, for this reason, interring the non-delegation doctrine carries little 
in the way of a democratic price. If anything, the burial comes with a 
democratic dividend, as it removes a cloud from delegated authority, and 
thereby allows Congress to pursue public objectives by delegating to 
procedurally constrained agencies. 
The argument for de novo review is closer. The theory of this Article 
places a premium on the rationality of decisionmaking, that is, on the 
connection between statutory objectives and chosen means, with less direct 
implications for how to interpret the scope of delegated authority. 
Still, several considerations press us toward deference and away from de 
novo review. First, though the theory of this Article elevates judicial review, 
it does not suppose that courts can resolve true ambiguities in statutes more 
ably than agencies. It seems likely, indeed, that forcing generalist judges to 
find a statutory answer where one does not exist267 will harm the sought-after 
 
264 See supra Part I. 
265 Id. 
266 On constitutional grounds, this again resembles Justice Stevens’ view in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 487-88 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. 
267 Notice that this position casts into relief the critical question of when an ambiguity exists. 
To answer this question, one must adopt a theory of statutory interpretation. The debate between 
textualists and purposivists fills countless volumes. For prominent examples of purposivist 
scholarship, see William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-25 (1990) 
(critiquing the “new textualism” advocated by Justice Scalia), and ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 
JUDGING STATUTES 9 (2014) (arguing for purposivism based on the realities of congressional 
drafting practices, and also providing an excellent overview of the long-running debate between 
textualists and purposivists). For prominent textualist works, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (explaining 
principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation), and John F. Manning, What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (arguing that textualism “remains 
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goals of rationality and fairness.268 A second challenge with de novo review is 
that the Judiciary is a “they, not an it,”269 meaning that judges will interpret 
ambiguous statutory terms in varied and often unpredictable ways, inevitably 
blundering along the way. This adds noise to the system and undermines 
legislative objectives. Of course, under Chevron the agency must still adopt a 
permissible interpretation of the statute, but among permissible 
interpretations submitting to the agency’s view rather than to the 
multitudinous views of judges offers many advantages, most obviously a 
unitary interpretation that is informed by agency experience.270 Finally, to 
the extent one favors dethroning Chevron for democracy-forcing reasons, the 
same considerations relevant to the non-delegation doctrine apply. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative lawmaking, this Article suggests, is compromised by favor-
giving and the influence of special interest lucre, leading the public to distrust 
the institution. This Article has articulated a novel theory of how the 
administrative state, if suitably constrained, can generate superior public trust 
 
distinctive because it [still] gives priority to semantic text” despite its use of contextual evidence). 
See also John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) (examining 
the extent to which textualists may value legislative intent). This Article plainly weighs on the side 
of purposivism, for the simple reason that if we seek ends–means rationality, it makes good sense to 
consider the ends explicitly. It is heartening, therefore, that the Court seems to be inching in this 
direction. In King v. Burwell, for instance, the Court refused to apply Chevron deference, instead 
consulting the “context” of the statute in question, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and construing 
specific terms “with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized this approach as 
focusing on the “design and purposes” of the ACA rather than a narrower reading of the text of the 
relevant terms. Id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But from the perspective of fairness and ends-
means rationality, there is little doubt that the majority’s approach far more respected the relevant 
ends, as the dissenting interpretation would have seriously undermined the policy scheme erected 
by the statute. Indeed, leading up to the Supreme Court’s consideration of the case, many wrote 
warnings of the dire negative policy consequences that would flow from the position that Justice 
Scalia eventually adopted. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Here’s What the Supreme Court Could Do to 
Insurance Premiums in Your State, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 11, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/120233/king-v-burwell-how-supreme-court-could-wreck-obamacare-states 
[http://perma.cc/3MHP-7VGL]. 
268 Here, I seem to depart from Professors Farber and O’Connell, who suggest they might be 
open to downgrading Chevron deference in favor of Skidmore deference. See Farber & O’Connell, 
supra note 195, at 1186. 
269 Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of 
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 550 (2005). 
270 The importance of this point is diminished but not eliminated by the fact that the D.C. 
Circuit hears many of the challenges to agency rules, and that the Circuit has a strong norm of 
following the Circuit precedents, even absent en banc hearings. The D.C. Circuit is preeminent in 
administrative law largely due to congressional designation. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of 
Vermont Yankee, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 143-44 (Peter Strauss ed., 2005). 
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in its decisionmaking, an attribute that leads Members of Congress to 
delegate authority to administrative agencies. 
Once we abandon the myth that legislative lawmaking necessarily 
possesses democratic legitimacy, in the sense that it serves a plausible notion 
of the public interest, it refocuses and clarifies our normative and doctrinal 
debates. Those debates have been hung up on the fact that administrative 
lawmaking invests unelected officials with discretion, thereby giving life to 
the ill-advised (and unenforceable) non-delegation doctrine,271 and drawing 
scholars into abortive efforts to find “democracy” somewhere in 
administrative agencies. But the elevation of the legislature is misplaced, as 
that institution often disserves the public interest; neither is a robust non-
delegation doctrine likely to effectuate democratic values, nor should scholars 
attempt to find democracy in administrative lawmaking. The objectives of 
administrative law should, instead, be to design meaningful constraints that 
effectuate statutory designs and promote rationality and transparency in 
public policymaking. In so doing, administrative lawmaking is likely to better 
serve the public’s interest and, paradoxically, live out democratic values than 
the legislature itself. 
ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 
A. Legislation 
1. Preliminaries 
This Appendix articulates a formal theoretical model that motivates much 
of the analysis in the body of this Article. The objective of the model is to 
capture the relevant legislative dynamics in the simplest possible form. To 
begin with, suppose that the legislature cannot delegate authority to an 
agency. For example, suppose we had a strong (and enforceable) non-
delegation doctrine that effectively forced the legislature to make policy 
decisions itself. 
The policy choice in question is between two alternatives, ∈ { , }. For 
example, between high and low railroad rates, or a bailout and no bailout, or 
strong and weak restrictions on proprietary trading. The legislature may 
either be faithful to the voter or not. For the purposes of this exercise, I 
remain deliberately agnostic about the way in which the legislature may not 
be faithful. For example, the legislature may be corrupt or captured, or it may 
be ideologically impure. Letτ = f  denote a legislator who is faithful to the 
 
271 See also Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 2-3.  
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voter, and τ = c  denote a legislator who is not aligned with the voter on the 
relevant dimension. The probability that the legislator is aligned is π . 
Let the voter’s payoffs over policies depend only on the state of the world, 
ω ∈ {0,1}, such that, 
 
 
 
The voter, therefore, wants to see the policy set equal to the state of the 
world. For example, suppose that a high railroad rate is required in some 
public sense in state ω =1 but not ω = 0 ; the voter then wants p =1 if ω =1, 
and p = 0  if ω = 0 . The legislator observes ω  but the voter does not. Let 
p(ω =1) = γ . 
Legislators differ in the payoffs they assign to policies. If the legislator is 
faithful (τ = f ), he shares the voter’s payoffs, as above. However, if the 
legislator is not aligned (τ = c ), his payoffs instead run as follows, 
 
 
 
 
This means that the non-aligned legislator does best when p =1 
regardless of the state of the world, ω . For example, even if the railroad 
survives without the increase, or the rate increase is otherwise unnecessary 
for systemic reasons, the legislator still prefers to increase the rate. 
A legislator potentially gains both from policy and reelection. Let ρ >1 
denote the value that the legislator attaches to continuing in office. This 
might reflect the value placed on ego rents, the perks of office, or the like, 
and reflects the present discounted stream of benefits that the legislator 
would receive from winning reelection. 
The trouble for the voter is that, though she sees whether the legislature 
sets p =1 or p = 0 , she does not observe either τ  or ω . That is, in the 
language of the Article, she does not know if the legislator is faithful (τ = f ) 
and, because she does not observe ω , she does not know if the chosen policy 
is in her best interest. If the voter knew that the legislator was faithful, she 
would not care about not being able to observe ω , as she would trust that 
the faithful legislator resolved matters in her interest. And, so long as the 
legislator sufficiently values his seat,272 if she observed ω  she would not care 
about not being able to observe τ , as she would be able to punish the legislator 
for going against her interests and deter him from engaging in that deviant 
behavior. But she observes neither ω  or τ , which poses a considerable 
problem for the voter.  
 
272 This is satisfied by assuming that          . 
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I assume that reelection is a function of the voter’s beliefs about the 
probability that the legislator is faithful. In particular, let μ(p)  denote the 
voter’s beliefs about the legislator’s faithfulness after observing p . The 
probability that the legislator is reelected is F(μ(p)), where F  is strictly 
increasing in μ(p) , and F(0) = 0  and F(1) =1. This approach to modeling 
the political environment and reelection essentially follows earlier modeling 
efforts by Professors Fox and Jordan.273 
To summarize and clarify, then, the sequence of the interaction is as 
follows: (1) nature determines the state of the world, ω ∈ {0,1}, and 
whether the legislator is faithful, τ ∈ { f ,c} . The legislator observes both 
values, but the voter observes neither: (2) the legislature sets p ∈ {0,1}; 
and (3) the voter updates beliefs about the likelihood that the legislator is 
faithful, and reelects him on the basis of those beliefs. All actors receive 
payoffs. I seek to characterize salient perfect Bayesian equilibria.274 
2. Equilibria 
A number of salient equilibria exist in this setting. A first equilibrium to 
consider involves the legislators playing their types. In particular, the f-type 
legislator sets p = ω , and the c-type legislator sets p =1. Under these 
strategies, if the voter observes p =1, she is unsure if the legislator is of 
type f or c. Bayes’s rule implies that her belief that he is of type f is  
 
 
By comparison, if the voter observes p = 0 , she knows with certainty 
that the legislator is of type f, i.e., μ(0) =1, generating relatively favorable 
reelection prospects for that legislator. This fosters an electoral incentive for 
the legislators of both types to deviate by setting p = 0 . For example, the f-
type legislator may observe ω =1, yet set p = 0  for electoral reasons. 
Likewise, the c-type legislator may set p = 0  in some state of the world. 
Comparing the equilibrium payoffs to the deviation payoffs indicates that the 
equilibrium is sustained against this reelection interest when  
 
 
Another equilibrium involves the legislator following prior beliefs of the 
voter about the best policy. Under the assumption that  
 
 
 
273 See generally Justin Fox & Stuart V. Jordan, Delegation and Accountability, 73 J. POL. 831 (2011). 
274 For this intuition-building exercise, I limit attention to pure strategies. 
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the voter believes that p = 0  is generally the most appropriate policy.275  
 The strategies in this equilibrium simply involve both types of legislators 
setting p = 0 , following the voter’s uninformed belief about the best policy. 
Because both types select p = 0  regardless of the state of the world, the voter 
cannot update beliefs about the type of the legislator if she observes p = 0 , 
meaning that μ(0) = π . If she observes p =1, she needs some off-the-path 
beliefs, and under a standard refinement,276 she assumes that the type of the 
legislator is c, as statistically he is most likely to benefit from the deviation. 
This implies that this equilibrium survives when               . 
3. Commentary 
The analysis above makes it plain that the faithful legislator is electorally 
harmed by the presence of the captured legislator. Most notably, in the 
equilibrium in which the legislators play to type—i.e., the faithful legislator 
sets p = ω  and the captured legislature always sets p =1—the voter cannot 
be sure if the legislator is faithful or captured if the observed policy is p =1
. Upon seeing p =1, in fact, the voter downgrades her assessment of the 
legislator’s faithfulness relative to prior beliefs:                           
 
 
This translates directly into a reduced chance of reelection for the faithful 
legislator. 
Much the same can be said of the pooling equilibrium. There, the fact that 
the voter confuses the faithful legislator with the captured legislature induces 
the faithful legislator to select the policy that the voter a priori believes to be 
most appropriate—i.e., p = 0 , even when the legislator knows that he and 
the voter would be best off with p =1. This equilibrium is not particularly 
attractive on policy terms. Further, as above, the incumbent faithful legislator 
faces lower reelection chances as a result of the captured legislator. That is, 
the voter cannot update beliefs about the legislator as a result of the pooling 
 
275 It can be shown that the other candidate pooling equilibrium—with         and both types of 
legislators therefore selecting         —does not exist, at least under reasonable off-the-path beliefs. 
Such beliefs would entail that a deviation to           leads the voter to believe the legislator is of 
type f. See by analogy the reasoning of supra note 272. This would mean that any time          , the f-
type legislator would face unambiguous incentives to deviate to        . 
276 Under the refinement, the voter, upon observing a deviation to      , believes that the 
legislator is type c based on the fact that statistically the c-type legislator is more likely to benefit 
from that policy. This resembles the Criterion D1 refinement. See In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, 102 Q. J. ECON. 179 (1987) (addressing the effect of restrictions 
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs). For a similar approach to beliefs in a similar context, see Justin Fox 
& Stuart V. Jordan, supra note 273, at 831 (exploring a “model of electoral agency in which legislators 
can either determine policy directly or delegate policymaking authority to an expert bureaucrat”). 
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strategies, meaning that the probability of reelection is F(π ), some quantity 
less than one.  
B. Delegation and Administrative Procedures 
1. Preliminaries 
Now suppose that, instead of setting the policy choice, the legislature may 
delegate the policymaking to an administrative agency. The agency, as the 
legislature, observes ω , and the motivation for delegation does not come 
from the superior expertise of the agency. The agency is, instead, 
distinguished by the fact that it operates under a set of constraints, in 
particular administrative procedures and judicial review. 
If the legislature delegates, the statute takes the form of state-contingent 
instructions to the agency: for example, “if ω = x , set p = y ,” where 
x, y ∈ {0,1}. Let s = p0p1 denote the statute, where px  is the instructed 
policy when ω = x . For instance, s = 01 is equivalent to, “set p = ω ,” and 
might be thought of as saying, “set policy in the public interest.” 
Administrative procedures represent a complex body of rules that 
undoubtedly serve multiple interests in our political system. To date, most 
positive scholars have focused on how procedures allow the legislature to 
“control” administrative agencies, that is, to attenuate the familiar problem of 
agency costs.277 I wish to consider an alternative analytical root for 
administrative procedures, and so I eliminate agency costs (as between the 
legislature and administrative agency) by assuming that the administrative 
agency is of the same type as the legislature. As above, let τ ∈ { f ,c}  denote 
agency types, with payoffs also following from above. 
As an alternative positive rationale for procedures, let us take seriously 
the notion that they exist to promote fairness, transparency, and legitimacy. 
For maximal simplicity, suppose the legislature faces a choice between 
imposing procedures and judicial review on the agency or not. If the 
legislature imposes procedures, the agency reveals its read of the world, ω , 
to the public, and is subjected to judicial review;278 if the legislature does not 
impose procedures, it is not required to do so. We might imagine richer 
procedural choices involving other tradeoffs. For example, stricter procedures 
and review might probabilistically force the agency to reveal its read of the 
world, and might further implicate some tradeoff in agency effectiveness—
that is, stricter procedure and review might implicate some probability that 
 
277 See McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 34, at 244 (discussing the principal-
agent problem, and arguing that administrative procedures diminish agency costs). 
278 For a doctrinal analog, see, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (holding that a federal agency must disclose the data on which it relies in promulgating a rule). 
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the agency fails to issue a policy altogether. Such considerations would clearly 
influence the nature of procedures that the legislature imposes on the agency, 
but the way in which they would influence this choice would depend heavily 
on assumptions about the correspondences between procedural rigor and the 
outcomes of interest—fairness and transparency, on one hand, and on the 
other administrative effectiveness. Given such tradeoffs, it is unlikely that the 
legislature would opt for complete procedural fairness or transparency, but 
beyond earning this modest observation the payoff of modeling more 
complex procedures is unclear, particularly as we do not have any empirical 
guidance on the relevant correspondences. 
Much as in McNollGast, administrative procedures have consequences 
because the courts enforce them. Here, courts set aside agency actions that 
violate administrative procedures, such that if the agency fails to reveal the 
state, or if s = 01, and the agency sets p =1 despite ω = 0 , the court sets 
aside the agency action. This form of judicial review approximates that notion 
under the APA wherein courts set aside agency actions, for example, that fail 
to divulge the evidence that the agency relies on,279 or more generally exhibit 
inadequate connection between evidence and reasoning and stated agency or 
statutory objectives.280 If the court sets aside the agency action, all players 
receive a payoff of zero. To be clear, the judicial system is not a strategic actor 
in this model. 
So amended, the sequence of the interaction is as follows: (1) nature 
determines the state of the world, ω ∈ {0,1}, and whether the legislator and 
the agency are faithful, τ ∈ { f ,c}  (the legislator observes both values, but 
the voter observes neither); (2) the legislature decides whether to write a 
delegating statute, s , or set policy directly through legislation, p , and if the 
former whether to impose procedures on the agency; (3) if the legislature 
delegates to the agency with procedures and review, the agency sets policy, 
and the court reviews it for consistency with procedural requirements and the 
statute; if the legislature delegates without procedures and review, the agency 
sets the policy; and (4) the voters observe the choices of whether to delegate 
and to do so with procedures and review, update beliefs about the likelihood 
that the legislator is faithful, and reelect him on the basis of those beliefs. All 
actors receive payoffs. As above, I seek to characterize salient perfect Bayesian 
equilibria. 
 
279 Id. 
280 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 
(1983) (holding that an agency must explain the evidence underlying its rule in relation to relevant 
alternatives). 
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2. Equilibria 
The possibility of delegation with administrative procedures dramatically 
alters legislative behavior. This follows from the fact that it is almost always 
in equilibrium for the faithful legislator to delegate with the statute s = 01, 
and to impose procedures on the administrative agency.281 These strategies 
always result in p = ω , as the policy preferred by the legislator, and further 
maximizes his reelection prospects. That p = ω  comes from the fact that, 
under the assumption of an aligned agency, the agency is also faithful, and 
therefore faces no incentive to set p ≠ ω  if delegated authority from the 
legislature. On the question of reelection, if the captured legislator’s 
strategies call for him to either not delegate, or to delegate without 
procedures, this produces a separating equilibrium—if the equilibrium 
exists—and therefore results in reelection of the faithful legislator with 
probability one. If on the other hand the captured legislator delegates with 
procedures, pooling with the faithful legislator, one of two scenarios unfolds, 
depending on agency behavior. If the agency’s strategy involves setting 
p ≠ ω  then voters observe the mismatch by virtue of procedures and judicial 
review, allowing voters to update beliefs about the legislator, effectively 
producing a separating equilibrium. If the agency’s strategy is to set p = ω , 
the voter cannot update beliefs, but under any reasonable refinement, a 
deviation from the delegation with procedures strategy compels the voter to 
regard the deviating legislator as captured, implying that the faithful 
legislator cannot increase his reelection odds by so deviating.282 These 
considerations indicate that, under reasonable off-the-path beliefs, it is always 
in equilibrium for the faithful legislator to delegate with procedures in place. 
If the faithful legislator adopts this strategy, the captured legislator must 
often consider a policy, reelection tradeoff. Note that if ω =1, the legislator 
faces no tradeoff, as delegating with procedures maximizes both quantities; 
so let ω = 0 . In this case, directly legislating allows the legislator to set p =1
, producing a policy payoff of 1, but at the cost of any hope of reelection. By 
comparison, deviating to s = 01 with procedures, and assuming that the agency 
follows the statute,283 produces a payoff of F(π )ρ  (that is, no policy payoff, 
plus pooling reelection odds). Thus, as long as   
 
 
direct legislation is not in equilibrium for the captured legislator. The same 
is true of delegating without procedures and judicial review: the agency now 
 
281 Under reasonable off-the-path beliefs, it is always in equilibrium, as discussed below. 
282 Again, the refinement above, supra note 272, would imply this of the voters’ beliefs. 
283 This agency behavior is in equilibrium, as deviating produces no policy benefit for the 
agency following judicial review. 
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sets the policy, but the voter infers the same information from the lack of 
procedures as she does from direct legislation. 
We can go further to state that, under reasonable off-the-path beliefs, it 
is never in equilibrium for the faithful legislator to directly legislate. To see 
this, suppose that the faithful legislator’s strategies call on him to directly 
legislate. If the strategies of the captured legislator call on her to delegate, 
then it is in the captured legislator’s interest to deviate to direct legislation 
any time the state of the world is against her interest, as doing so increases 
both electoral odds and policy payoffs. If instead the captured legislature 
directly legislates, the faithful legislator faces an incentive to deviate and 
delegate with procedures; under reasonable off-the-path beliefs, the voter 
updates to believe that the legislator is faithful, and this also maximizes his 
policy payoffs. 
3. Commentary 
It is clear from this analysis that the faithful legislator is almost always 
better off with a system of delegation and fair, transparent procedures than 
with direct legislation. This device of delegation with safeguards greatly 
reduces the electoral risks inherent in direct legislation, wherein the voter 
often cannot tell whether the legislator is faithful or not. Indeed, unlike direct 
legislation, the worst that the faithful legislator can do with respect to 
reelection is face odds based on the voters’ prior beliefs. 
C. Thoughts on Transitions 
A natural question is why we might move from a world of direct 
legislation to one largely of delegation. That is, if delegation is superior for 
all of the electoral reasons highlighted in Section B of this Appendix, why did 
we have some approximation of direct legislation for much of our history, as 
modeled in Section A? The simple models above suggest answers to this 
question. 
Policy complexity is a first pre-condition for distrust to exist in serious 
measure. That is, when voters see one policy rather than another, they must 
face considerable uncertainty about whether it is in their best interest. 
Although this kind of uncertainty almost surely existed throughout our 
country’s history in some way, it also undoubtedly has increased as the 
economy has grown more complex and the government’s relationship with 
businesses has become more involved. This suggests that we might expect to 
see fundamental transitions following periods of rapid economic growth, 
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particularly if growth is intertwined with state activity. That feature 
characterizes much of the half century following the Civil War.284 
Closely related, we might expect to see a striking transition if people’s 
perceptions of corruption change. In the terms of the model, this perception is 
reflected in π , voters’ prior beliefs that the politician is faithful. A sharp 
reduction in π  implies that the electoral costs of distrust increase 
dramatically for the faithful legislator, providing him an incentive to develop 
alternative lawmaking means. The rise of muckraking journalism around the 
turn of the century, for example, plausibly had a marked effect on π .285 It 
may therefore be no accident that a characteristic of the roughly co-incident 
progressive era involves the delegation of authority from legislatures to 
various lawmaking commissions,286 subject to judicial review. 
 
 
284 See generally ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE 
U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016). 
285 E.g., LOUIS FILLER, THE MUCKRAKERS 9 (1968) (observing of muckraker journalism, 
“Now, suddenly, there appeared . . . a new, moral, radical type of writing . . . [that] savagely exposed 
grafting politicians”). 
286 E.g., RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN 
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 319 (1986) (noting that “the 
brief period from 1904 to 1908 saw a remarkably compressed political transformation. During these 
years the regulatory revolution peaked; new and powerful agencies of government came into being 
everywhere”). 
